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ABSTRACT 
In irregular warfare (IW) conflicts, where winning the support of the population is often 
key, the United States military historically has demonstrated consistent difficulty in 
developing metrics that describe the effectiveness of its operations. We identify 
previously neglected aspects of the problem.  More specifically, we argue that the 
institutional pressures generated by a conflict’s national imperative, when combined with 
the military’s own bureaucratic characteristics, cause the military organization to focus 
on inappropriate measurements.  This causes it to misinterpret the IW environment and 
therefore misjudge its operational effectiveness. Thus, the search for useful metrics of 
success in IW must seek to overcome not only the difficulties inherent to measuring IW, 
but endemic organizational characteristics of the U.S. military; understanding this 
heretofore neglected interactive effect is crucial to understanding the nature of the metrics 
problem in irregular warfare campaigns. We develop our argument and illustrate it using 
historical cases of U.S. IW campaigns. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A.  PURPOSE 
In irregular warfare (IW) environments, where winning the support of the 
population is often key, the United States and its military have consistently demonstrated 
difficulty in developing metrics to analyze the effectiveness of its operations.  Failure to 
understand effectiveness in IW leads to difficulty in determining a clear strategy toward 
success.  Too often in the history of United States’ involvement in IW, the United States 
becomes too focused on inappropriate metrics to reflect progress and success, or fails to 
select the appropriate metrics amongst endless volumes of data to accurately reflect the 
environment and the winning of population perceptions and support.  The purpose of this 
thesis is to examine whether certain external stakeholder and internal organizational 
pressures influence the military toward developing and selecting metrics that can be 
ineffective in evaluating success in IW.  This thesis will also discuss how to overcome 
these pressures and have the ability to focus on appropriate metrics that best represent 
effectiveness in the IW environment and success in winning the population’s support.    
B.  BACKGROUND 
Throughout the past decade, the United States and its allies have been engaged in 
IW conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, as we fight for influence and control over their 
respective populations.  Furthermore, it appears likely that IW conflicts like those in Iraq 
and Afghanistan will remain a persistent challenge in the international environment 
through the foreseeable future.   Over the past decade, the United States has obtained a 
great deal of institutional knowledge in IW through lessons learned and experiences 
among a number of different environments, populations, and contexts.  However, what is 
still lacking is the ability of military commanders and planners to effectively measure 
progress and success in an IW campaign.   At the start of the Global War on Terror, 
military units preferred to evaluate and measure their success in familiar and relatively 
simple terms.  Often this involved evaluations based primarily upon the number of 
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operations conducted, the number of enemy killed or captured, the number of 
reconstruction projects initiated and other similar criteria.  These metrics, while easily 
accessible to units in terms of their collection and interpretation, do not necessarily 
represent effectiveness in winning the population’s support.  Over the past several years, 
the United States government and military has begun to undertake a more population-
centric approach toward IW; but, the United States still demonstrates a strong preference 
to rely upon quantifiable metrics of activity which invite serious complications with 
validity and reliability.  That is, quantifiable metrics of activity may often provide 
inconsistent information, or worse, fail to depict true progress in the IW conflict.  
Moreover, these often lack the descriptive depth necessary to facilitate the necessary 
understanding of the IW environment.  While many scholars and military planners 
continue to debate and define correct metrics for IW, the foundation of the problem lies 
with the pressures created by policy-maker and public demands, and certain 
organizational tendencies present in the military structure.   
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The U.S.’s protracted engagement in IW conflicts within Iraq, Afghanistan and 
other regions following September 11, 2001, have prompted increased interest in how to 
appropriately measure progress in IW.  Recognizing its doctrinal preoccupation with 
conventional war fighting and limited guidance on IW principles, the Army published 
FM 3–24 in December 2006 to partially address this oversight with regard to 
counterinsurgency (COIN).  While helpful in broad terms, FM 3–24’s limited value in 
addressing how to measure progress and success is evident in the wide body of literature 
on the subject that has recently grown from within policy and academic communities.  
The result is a collection of works that approaches the issue from a variety of 
perspectives, but achieves little consensus or practicality in terms of application. 
Currently, the predominant effort evident in recent metrics literature is a 
prescriptive focus on finding the right metrics to evaluate IW conflicts.  Authors working 
toward this end utilize several different approaches to sort through and determine the 
appropriate metrics.  While several works devise lists of proposed metrics, many scholars 
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tend to first arrange metrics based on focus areas.  Heather Gregg in “Beyond Population 
Engagement: Understanding the Goals of Counterinsurgency” refers to these focus areas 
as “pillars.”1  Organizing metrics by these pillars allows the military organization to 
focus on improving outcomes among the numerous interrelated focuses of IW, all geared 
toward winning population support and achieving success in IW.  However, the various 
authors writing on the subject tend to use different, but slightly similar, pillars for 
arranging metrics.  For instance, Gregg recommends pillars based on security, 
economics, governance, justice, social capital and national identity.2  Michael Dziedzic, 
Barbara Sotirin, and John Agoglia (eds.) in Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments 
(MPICE), focus on five pillars for measuring effectiveness:  political moderation and 
stable governance; safe and secure environment; rule of law; sustainable economy; and 
social wellbeing.3  On a slightly different note, David Kilcullen, in Counterinsurgency, 
devises pillars that are more practical and accessible for tactical units by dividing them 
into population-related, host nation, security force, and enemy; and by providing 
numerous sample metrics for each pillar.4  Overall, these works demonstrate the effort 
exerted to organize the various forms and arrangements of metrics in hopes of 
determining which prove most appropriate for evaluating progress and success in the IW 
conflict.  However, these works, and many others, do not account for the inherent 
influences of metrics themselves, or the external and internal influences that shape which 
metrics an organization selects.   
Another supporting element within this widely embraced prescriptive effort 
includes works that examine metric development and use analytically.  Metrics serve to 
distill the seemingly infinite number of available observations one can make about an IW 
environment into terms that can be collected, analyzed, and interpreted in a way that will 
                                                 
1 Heather S. Gregg, “Beyond Population Engagement:  Understanding the Goals of 
Counterinsurgency,” Parameters, 39(3), 21. 
2 Heather S. Gregg, “Beyond Population Engagement:  Understanding the Goals of 
Counterinsurgency,” Parameters, 39(3), 21. 
3 Michael Dziedzic, Barbara Sotirin, COL John Agoglia (eds.), Measuring Progress in Conflict 
Environments (MPICE)—A Metrics Framework for Assessing Conflict Transformation and Stabilization, 
Defense Technical Information Catalog, 2008, 
http://www.usip.org/files/resources/MPICE%20Aug%2008.pdf (Accessed on 30 March 2011), 6. 
4 David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 59. 
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inform military and political leaders on the efficacy of their chosen strategy.  However, 
IW’s foundation in perceptions, relationships, and influence, and similarly abstract 
concepts do not readily lend themselves to clear and accessible attributes for comparison.  
Accordingly, the distillation of IW’s essential qualities into accessible and comparable 
terms is understandably difficult and fraught with challenges in achieving accuracy, 
reliability, and validity.  Broadly speaking, these works seek to explore metrics’ 
foundational elements and apply social scientific methods in their use to realistically 
define their capabilities and thus identify their inherent strengths and weaknesses.  
William Murray, for example, examines the evaluation of metrics in terms of causality in 
his work “The Will to Measure.”5  Here, Murray postulates that an effective metric 
possesses the highest degree of correlation between a cause and the desired effect in his 
discussion on assessing military effectiveness. Similarly, Shon McCormick and Dave 
LaRivee provide guides meant to improve the audience’s understanding of metrics and 
inform the method of their use.6  The importance of this subject is often overlooked 
among works in the other categories.     
Improving the practitioner’s understanding of metrics, applying academic 
discipline to their development and use, and ultimately determining the best metrics for 
IW are all important efforts in improving U.S. military performance in IW conflict.  
However, the dominant focus in these areas reflects an implicit belief that the solution to 
the U.S. military’s apparent difficulty using metrics in IW lies within the metrics 
themselves.  However, the U.S. Army’s experience with metrics in Vietnam, as described 
in Gregory Daddis’ No Sure Victory, suggests that other considerations warrant attention 
as well.  Daddis’ account strikingly contrasts a common perception that the military 
failed to measure its efforts thoroughly, and instead demonstrates the enormous amount 
of effort and resources devoted to data collection throughout its involvement.7  To 
                                                 
5 William S. Murray, “A Will to Measure,” in Parameters (Autumn, 2001), pp. 134–157. 
6 Shon McCormick, “A Primer on Developing Measures of Effectiveness,” Military Review (United 
States Army Combined Arms Center), July-August 2010: 60–66. 
Dave LaRivee, “Best Practices Guide for Conducting Assessments in Counterinsurgencies,” Small 
Wars Journal, August 2011: 1–35. 
7 Gregory A. Daddis, No Sure Victory: Measuring U.S. Army Effectiveness and Progress in the 
Vietnam War (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 10, 224. 
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illustrate this inundation of data, reports evaluating merely one aspect of the military’s 
effort in 1967 produced approximately 900,000 pages monthly.8  Thus, No Sure Victory 
suggests that the military in fact possessed great capability to collect a wide variety of 
different measurements in IW, many of which undoubtedly could have proved useful.  
Yet, despite the reams of data available after years of collection, the military in Vietnam 
seemingly appeared unable to ever fully understand its environment and unable to 
determine which metrics would best guide its efforts toward a more successful 
conclusion. 
With the capability to collect a wide variety of measurement types, and the 
availability of seemingly endless amounts of data, the military’s difficulty with metrics in 
IW appears to hinge more upon the military’s preference among available metrics, and 
less about what it is capable of measuring, or the metrics themselves.  If true, this 
conclusion prompts further questions regarding what drives the military’s preference 
among measurements in IW.  Few selections among the metrics literature address what 
these influences are, whether they are internal or external, or discuss what their specific 
impact may be.      
D.  RESEARCH GOAL   
Overall, from examining the above literature, we discovered that there exists a 
void in analyzing the institutional pressures that affect metrics development and 
selection.  Thus, the question this thesis intends to answer is:  What are the factors that 
affect metrics development in IW, and how do these factors influence our ability to 
interpret the IW environment and select appropriate metrics for evaluating progress and 
success?  From this question this thesis will provide awareness of the pressures created 
by external demands and organizational tendencies on the military’s ability to develop 
appropriate metrics.  Using the cases of the Greek Civil War, Vietnam, and Operation 
IRAQI FREEDOM, this thesis will demonstrate how the military has historically 
managed these pressures and successfully, or unsuccessfully, employed metrics to 
                                                 
8 Gregory A. Daddis, No Sure Victory: Measuring U.S. Army Effectiveness and Progress in the 
Vietnam War (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 121. 
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evaluate progress and gauge strategy.  We selected the Greek Civil War, Vietnam, and 
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM because as IW conflicts they vary in historical context, 
geography, and enemy.  More importantly, these conflicts demonstrate variance in the 
pressures generated by external demands placed on the military, and by the 
organizational tendencies of the military force package selected for the conflict.  As we 
will show, the search for appropriate metrics of success in IW must seek to overcome 
these pressures and the bureaucratic inward focus of the U.S. military in order to measure 




II. THE METRICS DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The United States military is a results-based organization that regularly seeks to 
evaluate the progress and success of its strategy.  In conventional warfare, progress and 
success can be measured by indicators that have attractive qualities (valid, reliable, and 
quantifiable) and effects, such as geographic gains, battle damage assessments, 
production of war material, and unit activities.  However, in an irregular warfare (IW) 
environment, progress and success can be hard to define and evaluate due to the 
ambiguity and indirect nature of the conflict.  Success in IW requires gaining influence 
over and support of the population, while weakening popular support for the adversary.9  
Thus, evaluating success in IW requires an accurate and thorough interpretation of the 
environment in order to assess popular perceptions.  Unfortunately, an IW environment is 
complex and unstable, which provides a massive amount of measurable data that is 
always changing, and can overload analysts attempting to interpret the situation.  Thus, 
the challenge in an IW conflict is selecting the appropriate metrics that best measure true 
effectiveness of one’s strategy and indicates success.   
However, choosing the appropriate metrics is more than simply selecting the 
correct environmental data to evaluate.  The process of selecting metrics to evaluate 
progress and success is indirectly influenced by the national imperative, directly shaped 
by the military organization, and challenged by the nature of the metrics themselves, 
resulting in metrics that may be appropriate or inappropriate for IW.  The term national 
imperative here refers to the importance of the conflict in terms of national strategic 
policy, national interest, media influence, and the public support of the IW conflict.  In 
other words, the national imperative is the way the nation (leaders and people) “sees” and 
“values” the mission. All conflicts have a certain level of national imperative in order to 
justify U.S. military involvement; however, some conflicts appear to have a higher 
                                                 
9 Department of Defense, Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept, Version 1.0, 11 September 
2007, 21. 
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national imperative than others.  As we will show, the national imperative influences the 
metrics process by demanding increased reporting, faster results, and indicators of 
success.  The national imperative also influences the amount of resources applied to the 
given conflict.  The more resources applied to a conflict require a larger military 
organization to manage and utilize the resources.  Additionally, the culture of the military 
organization impacts the process of selecting metrics and the ability to measure progress.  
As we will develop below, traditional U.S. military organizational culture closely 
resembles a “machine bureaucracy,” that is, primarily focused on the internal efficiency 
of the system and is more concerned with quantifying activity than assessing the effects 
of its actions in transforming inputs into outputs.10  As a machine bureaucracy, the 
military demonstrates a strong preference to condition its activities for a simple and 
stable environment, which is not compatible with the complex and unstable IW 
environment.  Furthermore, the nature of the metrics themselves affects an organization’s 
ability to evaluate progress and success.  In the IW environment, there exists many 
different ways for an organization to define and categorize the various types of data 
collected in the conflict.   Understanding how to interpret the different categories of 
measurable data, in terms of their strengths and weaknesses, will assist a unit in 
evaluating the effects of their activities.  Finally, from the effects of national imperative, 
the culture of the military organization, and the nature of metrics, the organization then 
must determine if its selected metrics are appropriate or inappropriate for IW.  As success 
in IW is tied to winning popular support and popular perceptions, appropriate metrics 
must be able to quantitatively or qualitatively show progress in these areas, and identify 
the effects of the organization’s activities toward these goals.  
 We argue that due to influences present in metrics, it is often difficult to select 
and utilize the appropriate metrics for identifying effectiveness and progress in IW.  For 
instance, a high national imperative exerts influence on the military organization with 
demands for continuous reporting and demands for quick progress.  This pressure will 
then cause the military organization to select easily attainable metrics of agent activity to 
                                                 
10 James B. Quinn, Henry Mintzberg and Robert M. James, The Strategy Process: Concepts, Contexts, 
and Cases (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1988). 
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show progress.  However, these metrics are sometimes inappropriate for IW and do not 
reflect the true effects of the organization’s activities.  Figure 1 depicts a “causal chain” 
that influences the metrics process in IW.   
 
Figure 1.   Metrics Development Chain 
Variations in each of these nodes affect the ability of a military organization to 
evaluate and guide itself in an IW conflict.  The remainder of this chapter will focus on 
explaining these four areas and the impacts they have on metrics.  Being able to fully 
understand the effects of the metrics development process will help a military 
organization sort through the vast amounts of measurable data, ward off negative external 
pressures and organizational tendencies, and select the appropriate metrics for evaluating 
its progress and achieving success in IW.  This process begins with the national 
imperative of the conflict. 
B. NODE 1:  NATIONAL IMPERATIVE 
The national imperative affects how a military organization, tasked to conduct 
IW, evaluates progress by shaping the scale of military forces involved in the conflict, 
and by creating demands for easily quantifiable measurements of success.  The national 
imperative relates to national interest, which stems from national policy, strategic goals, 
popular support, and public perception.  In organizational theory, the higher the 
importance of an operation results in increased pressures from the external stakeholders 
of the organization.11  For a military organization, the external stakeholders are primarily 
represented by the policy-makers comprising the executive and congressional leadership 
of the nation who develop national policy and strategic goals.  If an IW conflict has a 
                                                 
11 Richard L. Daft, Essentials of Organization Theory and Design (Mason, OH: Thomson Learning, 
2003), 27. 
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high national imperative due to its bearing on national policy, then the stakeholders will 
demand increased reporting and more results from the military organization.  As a result, 
the military organization in IW will more likely rely on quantifiable measures of 
organizational (agent) activity, because these metrics are easily accessible and succinct, 
thus providing quick and easy reporting to satisfy external stakeholders’ demands for 
information associated with the high national imperative.   Another aspect of national 
imperative is the influence of popular support and public perception on the external 
stakeholders.  Policy-makers remain constantly focused on public perceptions as required 
by the nature of their profession.  Furthermore, in times of conflict population support is 
often fickle, especially in IW conflicts that are typically long in duration.  Additionally, 
the media also plays a significant role because the publicity of the conflict and the stories 
told can shape the attitudes of the population and the responses of the stakeholders, 
regardless of the truth contained in those stories.  Therefore, the stakeholders’ desire to 
satisfy the media and placate the population can increase the national imperative.   This 
increase will cause the stakeholders to demand quicker results and increased reporting in 
order to appease the media and the population.  In response to these pressures, the 
military organization will be tempted to focus on quantifiable measurements of agent 
activity that relate internal productivity to progress, especially because numbers convey a 
sense of validity and objectivity.  However, the reliance on numbers can be misleading 
and only provide an illusion of short-term progress.   Also, the pressures of the media and 
the population often cause the stakeholders to place constraining timelines on the military 
organization, which causes the military organization to rely on quick producing 
measurements of agent activity, instead of waiting for the development of long term 
measurements that depict the true effects of operations toward progress and success.   
Another consequence of an increased national imperative is the associated 
increase in the commitment of national resources.  The importance of IW conflict toward 
national policy or popular attitudes will reflect in the amount of forces, money, and 
equipment dedicated toward the conflict.  With a high national imperative directed 
toward the conflict, the stakeholders will select a large military organization to manage 
the resources and appease national and international interests.  Over time, as the size of 
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the forces and the amount of resources committed to the conflict increases, the military 
organization tasked to manage the conflict will grow and will in turn develop increased 
machine bureaucratic tendencies in order to effectively manage the growing personnel 
and resources.  As the next section will explain, an increase in machine bureaucracy can 
sometimes influence an organization to focus more on its internal processes, and thus 
measure success by quantities of outputs and agent activity, and not by the effects, or 
outcomes, of its actions.  Therefore, a higher national imperative has the propensity to 
increase the machine bureaucracy characteristics of a military organization and disrupt 
the organization’s ability to develop effective metrics of success.   
However, a high national imperative is not always detrimental.  In a traditional, 
state-on-state conventional conflict, a high national imperative is an essential ingredient 
for success.  A high national interest and the support of large national resources are 
necessary for massing all elements of national power toward defeating the conventional 
foe.  Furthermore, harnessing the support of the population and the media is necessary for 
supporting the war with increased enlistments and public finances.  Therefore, in some 
conflicts a high national imperative can ensure victory by quickly coalescing national 
motivation, resources, and power toward defeating an enemy.   
Nonetheless, in an IW conflict, a high national imperative may have adverse and 
unintended effects, as it can distort the selection of the appropriate metrics for evaluating 
progress, steer a military organization toward inappropriate courses of action, and thus 
disrupt the ability of the military organization to achieve success.   For instance, a 
military organization’s measurements of number of raids conducted or high value targets 
captured provide easy quantifiable data of the unit’s activity that represents progress to a 
machine bureaucracy and, at the same time, satisfies stakeholder pressures.  However, 
these metrics do not necessarily provide an accurate portrayal of the effects of the 
operations toward winning the IW conflict.  Furthermore, a higher national imperative in 
terms of national policy interests could push certain political agendas, which may not be 
appropriate at the ground level of the IW conflict.  For example, a rush toward 
democracy creation, like in the early years of Operation Iraqi Freedom, could create a 
non-secular, majority driven regime with unintended negative consequences.  While the 
 12 
conduct of democratic elections provided good quantifiable metrics of activity in Iraq, it 
resulted in negative effects in the IW conflict as the Shias dominated the government and 
the Sunnis were frustrated with little representation.  As a result, in an IW conflict, often 
times a lower national imperative will give the military organization the time and latitude 
to work long term solutions, avoid the inward focus of bureaucratic systems, and 
therefore determine the appropriate outcome-based metrics for evaluating success.   
In order to demonstrate the influence of the national imperative on the metrics 
development process, this study will assess the degree of national imperative associated 
with historical cases of U.S. involvement in IW.  A high national imperative can be 
indicated by factors that include the frequency with which the conflict appears in the 
leading edge of the news, political messages, or legislative and executive actions.  
Conversely, low national imperative can be indicated by relatively little national political 
action or media attention.  As we discussed, an increased national imperative creates a 
demand for increased information and increases the amount of resources committed to 
the conflict.  The next section will describe how these factors will shape the activities of 
the selected military organization and will create tendencies to focus on inappropriate 
metrics in IW. 
C. NODE 2: THE U.S. MILITARY ORGANIZATION AND FORCE 
PACKAGE SELECTION 
While the degree of national imperative attached to a given conflict clearly exerts 
substantial influence on how the military evaluates its progress and success in warfare, 
the military’s own organizational characteristics also wield a great deal of influence.  As 
previously established, the degree of national imperative attributed to a given conflict 
will influence the type of military organization, or force package, selected by policy 
makers to engage in that conflict.  The field of organizational theory suggests that an 
organization’s structural arrangement and the coordinating mechanisms the organization 
uses to direct its operations exert a significant influence in determining how the 
organization evaluates its progress or success.  Studying the type of military force 
package selected, and thus obtaining a clearer understanding of its organizational 
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characteristics, should further illuminate how and why the force package chooses to 
assess its progress while engaged in conflict in a specified way.  This understanding 
assists further examination of metric types and assesses their appropriate application to 
differing forms of conflict, whether they are conventional or irregular, in subsequent 
sections.   
To facilitate this analysis, the following section will briefly describe Henry 
Mintzberg’s organizational model and its implications regarding organizational 
preference for measuring progress.  Also, this section will briefly evaluate the U.S. 
military’s organization through Mintzberg’s model, focusing on behaviors and 
coordination mechanisms.  While many agree that the U.S. military’s characteristics, 
behaviors, and culture are largely fixed, closer examination reveals that significant 
variation exists between individual services, branches and units.  Thus, the package of 
military units and components selected to engage in IW can be important in determining 
how the force package interprets and assesses the conflict environment.  This illustrates 
the degree of variance possible among military force packages selected to respond to 
conflict in terms of their organizational characteristics and measurement preferences.  In 
conclusion, this section will demonstrate that while the U.S. military’s dominant 
organizational characteristics primarily reflect Mintzberg’s machine bureaucracy, 
selected force packages may exhibit different organizational characteristics.  
Understanding that conflict environments vary widely between conventional and 
irregular forms, selection of the appropriate organization and attendant measurement 
scheme is critical to achieving success as efficiently as possible.     
1. Organizational Forms and Implications 
Mintzberg’s organizational model describes four (and one additional) archetypal 
organizations whose configuration and coordinating mechanisms ideally suit them to 
operate within an environment characterized by varying degrees of complexity and 
stability.12  In this model, an environment characterized by high values of both 
                                                 
12 James B. Quinn, Henry Mintzberg and Robert M. James, The Strategy Process: Concepts, Contexts, 
and Cases (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1988), 298–299. 
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complexity and instability fosters a correspondingly high degree of environmental 
uncertainty, where decision makers lack adequate information about the environment and 
have difficulty predicting environmental changes.13  Thus, these organizations’ structural 
forms and operating behaviors evolve, in part; to improve operations amidst the degree of 
environmental uncertainty they must contend with.  Describing the organizational forms 
that bound the two environmental extremes of stable/simple and unstable/complex 
illustrates the theoretical scope of those organizational characteristics that may be 
observed in further analysis of the U.S. military. 
 
Figure 2.   Organizational Forms and their Ideal Environment14  
To optimize operations in a highly simple and stable environment (see lower left 
quadrant of Figure 2), Mintzberg proposes the machine bureaucracy organizational form.  
The nature of this reasonably certain environment permits the machine bureaucracy to 
develop a large organizational structure that relies upon highly standardized and 
formalized work processes managed by a hierarchical administration.15  These processes 
facilitate greater coordination among the work force, which further enhances efficiency in 
                                                 
13 Richard L. Daft, Essentials of Organization Theory and Design (Mason, OH:Thomson Learning, 
2003), 52. 
14 Henry Mintzberg, “Organization Design: Fashion or Fit?,” Harvard Business Review (Harvard 
Business School Publishing) 59, no. 1 (January-February 1981), 107. Adapted from teachings by Prof Erik 
Jansen in Naval Postgraduate School course MN3121: Organizational Theory & Design, February 2011. 
15 James B. Quinn, Henry Mintzberg and Robert M. James, The Strategy Process: Concepts, Contexts, 
and Cases (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1988), 279, 281, 297. 
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organizational production.16  While formalized work processes assist in achieving tighter 
coordination of effort among the workforce, they also enhance control of the work output 
and thereby reduce variability in output.17  Reduced variability imparts a greater degree 
of predictability for the organization’s middle management and senior leadership who 
must routinely evaluate the organization’s overall progress and success in relation to its 
competitors and the environment.18  These characteristics suggest that while the machine 
places primary emphasis on achieving efficiency and productivity within its ‘ideal’ 
environment, they simultaneously limit the organization’s adaptability and potential to 
innovate new solutions if faced with increased complexity or instability.19   
In terms of evaluating progress and success, the preceding description illustrates 
the high degree of inward orientation exhibited by the machine bureaucracy, given the 
importance placed upon coordination, process efficiency, and production.  Predictably, 
assessments of success and progress will focus primarily upon measurements of 
organizational inputs, outputs, and processes, especially in quantitative terms.  These 
evaluations of organizational activity will rival or exceed the importance of assessing the 
organization’s impact on the environment and permit comparison of work output among 
the subordinate elements to detect variation in performance.  Detecting variation enables 
the organization to execute corrective action in the interest of achieving the desired level 
of coordination and uniformity. 
To contend with a highly complex and unstable environment, Mintzberg proposes 
the adhocracy organizational form.  The nature of this highly uncertain environment 
encourages the adhocracy to develop a looser, agile organizational structure that relies 
                                                 
16 James B. Quinn, Henry Mintzberg and Robert M. James, The Strategy Process: Concepts, Contexts, 
and Cases (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1988), 297. 
17 James B. Quinn, Henry Mintzberg and Robert M. James, The Strategy Process: Concepts, Contexts, 
and Cases (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1988), 281. 
Henry Mintzberg, “Organization Design: Fashion or Fit?,” Harvard Business Review (Harvard 
Business School Publishing) 59, no. 1 (January-February 1981): 7. 
18 James B. Quinn, Henry Mintzberg and Robert M. James, The Strategy Process: Concepts, Contexts, 
and Cases (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1988), 281. 
19 Henry Mintzberg, “Organization Design: Fashion or Fit?,” Harvard Business Review (Harvard 
Business School Publishing) 59, no. 1 (January-February 1981): 8. 
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upon a highly trained and educated work force to exercise judgment in determining and 
executing work requirements and production needs.20  These characteristics foster greater 
autonomy and thus require far less rigid organizational structure or standardization and 
formalization of work processes.21  This autonomy permits subordinates to devise 
innovative and adaptive responses to the complexity of their environment and implement 
them as its evolution and dynamics require.22  Finally, mutual adjustment among the 
organization’s subordinate elements further enhances the organization’s ability to 
develop, innovate, and implement improved practices as individual members learn from 
the successes and failures of the others.23  Rather than relying on a prescribed set of 
guidelines to direct activity, the organization communicates across its membership as 
lessons are learned, thereby speeding the organization’s learning cycle and improving 
response time to the environment.  
In terms of evaluating success and progress, the preceding description illustrates 
the high degree of outward orientation exhibited by the adhocracy, given the importance 
placed upon innovating and adapting responses to a changing environment.  Thus, 
measures of success and progress occur primarily through evaluating the organization’s 
impact (or effect) and response to the environment.  These organizations implicitly 
understand that discerning the true impact of their behavior within the dynamic 
complexity of their environment is difficult and requires constant monitoring and 
adjustment.  Behaviors that prove successful in one context do not immediately apply to 
the next and so these organizations expend more effort to obtain as complete and 
uninterrupted of an assessment of the environment as possible. 
                                                 
20 James B. Quinn, Henry Mintzberg and Robert M. James, The Strategy Process: Concepts, Contexts, 
and Cases (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1988), 301–302. 
21 Henry Mintzberg, “Organization Design: Fashion or Fit?,” Harvard Business Review (Harvard 
Business School Publishing) 59, no. 1 (January-February 1981): 10. 
22 Henry Mintzberg, “Organization Design: Fashion or Fit?,” Harvard Business Review (Harvard 
Business School Publishing) 59, no. 1 (January-February 1981): 11. 
23 James B. Quinn, Henry Mintzberg and Robert M. James, The Strategy Process: Concepts, Contexts, 
and Cases (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1988), 278–279. 
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2. The U.S. Military’s Organization 
The description of the two organizational forms that bound the extremes of 
Mintzberg’s model illustrates the wide degree of variance in organizational 
characteristics and behaviors through which one may analyze and interpret the U.S. 
military’s organization.  However, the forms described in this model serve only as 
idealistic renderings and therefore do not exist in a “pure” expression within any existing 
organization.  Rather, organizations express degrees of variation upon those major 
characteristics that define each form (and those in between), which allows them to reflect 
some elements of two or more of the archetypal forms Mintzberg offers.  A study of the 
U.S. military’s organization quickly reveals dominant machine bureaucratic tendencies, 
with the U.S. military possibly being the quintessential example of a bureaucratic 
institution.24  Placing specific emphasis on organizational behaviors and coordinating 
mechanisms, the military’s machine bureaucratic tendencies are best observed in, and 
delineated by, its administrative functions and operational activities.  The publication and 
strict enforcement of regulation and doctrine serve to formalize, standardize and thus 
coordinate all of the behaviors, expectations, and requirements for its members and 
subordinate organizations within these two core categories.   
The military’s administrative functions describe those systems, procedures and 
mechanisms that define how the military raises, trains, develops, and maintains the force 
in terms of its people, its equipment and its organizations.  Success in these 
administrative functions directly supports the military’s ability to conduct its operational 
activities.  The explicitly prescribed and closely managed process through which 
individuals are trained, evaluated, promoted and professionally developed within the 
services highlights one of the more powerful manifestations of machine bureaucratic 
behavior within the military.        
Alternatively, the military’s operational activities describe the training and 
execution of the military’s widely varied war-fighting skills that enable the force to 
                                                 
24 Jessica Glicken Turnley, Cross Cultural Competence and Small Groups: Why SOF are the way SOF 
are, JSOU Report 11–1, Joint Special Operations University (MacDill Air Force Base: The JSOU Press, 
2011), 52. 
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engage in sustained combat.  Also governed by doctrine and regulation and reinforced by 
regular intervals of professional development, the military exerts considerable effort at 
formalizing and standardizing the tactical and operational planning and practices of its 
units.  Arguably, the most potent means through which the U.S. military achieves a high 
degree of formalization, standardization, and coordination among its large force is in the 
codification of its official language, its planning process, and the tactics and procedures 
that explain how operations are conducted.  Together, these elements provide the 
foundation through which the military defines and prepares for its missions.  These 
enable military units from across the services and variety of branches to conceive and 
communicate ideas about training and operations and achieve a surprising degree of 
uniformity.  Similarly, the formalized prescribed process through which the military 
plans and produces formalized orders to initiate action reinforces the organization’s 
ability to coordinate and standardize their actions in a variety of settings and thus achieve 
greater unity of effort.        
While not an exhaustive accounting of all U.S. military organizational behavior, 
this discussion should underscore the military’s close reflection of the key behavioral 
characteristics relevant to a machine bureaucracy.  Correspondingly, these behaviors 
beget a strong tendency for the military to focus evaluations of individual and 
organizational success primarily through measuring their activities, especially in 
quantitative terms.  In this way, individual evaluation reports consistently focus on 
quantifying the contribution of an individual to the unit’s effort.  Likewise, higher 
headquarters’ assessment of its subordinate units focuses almost exclusively on 
organizational activities in terms of its inputs and outputs.  While different for each kind 
of unit, these may include the amount of terrain seized, the number of enemy captured or 
killed, the amount of clinics built and similar example.  This inclination to evaluate 
progress with an inward orientation on organizational activity necessarily occurs at the 
expense of an outward orientation toward the environment. 
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3. Organizational Variation in Force Package Selection 
While the military clearly exhibits a strong resemblance to Mintzberg’s machine 
bureaucracy, in practice, force packages selected from within the larger organization can 
demonstrate a surprising degree of variance in their behaviors and coordinating 
mechanisms that begin to reflect Mintzberg’s adhocracy.  However, just as no military 
unit mirrors the machine bureaucracy exactly, neither will they fully manifest all of the 
adhocracy’s various features.  In fact, however, far a force package may loosen its 
organizational behavior and mechanisms toward the adhocracy’s form, it will always 
maintains a strong tie to the machine bureaucratic form given its reliance upon the larger 
military institution for its instructions and support. 
A wide array of variables may influence how or why a selected force package 
may maintain the formalization and standardization of the machine or evolve to adopt the 
looser, adaptive, and innovative behaviors of the adhocracy.  A key factor, according to 
organizational theory, may be the size of the force package selected.25  Whereas a larger 
force package may require more formalization and standardization to maintain 
coordination and control, a smaller organization may find these procedures inhibiting.  
Experience and training is another important factor discussed by Mintzberg.26  A force 
package composed primarily of conventional forces that necessarily contains a large 
number of younger and less experienced soldiers is likely to rely on machine bureaucratic 
behaviors to maintain control and coordination.  Alternatively, a force package comprised 
of more senior, experienced, and highly trained soldiers may be comfortable relying 
instead on the judgment, mutual adjustment, and adaptation of its members to conduct its 
operations.  Jessica Glicken Turnley provides an excellent illustration of the potential 
variation in force package organizational behavior in her comparison of conventional 
forces and special operations forces (SOF). In her analysis, Glicken Turnley clearly 
illustrates the more “adhocratic” organizational structure and behavior of SOF forces 
                                                 
25 James B. Quinn, Henry Mintzberg and Robert M. James, The Strategy Process: Concepts, Contexts, 
and Cases (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1988), 293. 
26 Henry Mintzberg, “Organization Design: Fashion or Fit?,” Harvard Business Review (Harvard 
Business School Publishing) 59, no. 1 (January–February 1981): 7, 10. 
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with particular emphasis on their size, higher degree of training, and expertise.27  In 
contrast, her discussion of conventional, or general-purpose forces (GPF), clearly reflects 
the key organizational characteristics of the machine bureaucratic form.28 
4. Operationalizing Organizational Types 
In order to understand the relationship between selected force packages, the 
measurements of success they prefer to use, and these metrics’ suitability to differing 
combat environments, this study will assess the degree of bureaucratic or adhocratic 
behavior these forces demonstrate in historical cases.  Force packages that primarily 
reflect machine bureaucratic behavior will clearly demonstrate any of several distinct 
tendencies.  These include a high degree of directive and centralized control over 
subordinate units, as well as strict adherence to tactical doctrine and administrative 
procedures (standardization and formalization) regardless of its suitability.  In terms of 
organizational structure, machine bureaucratic force packages will tend to be 
significantly larger organizations with large headquarters, multiple subordinate 
headquarters and a high ratio of support soldiers to combat soldiers.  Force packages that 
assume more adhocratic behavior will generally reflect the opposite of these attributes.  
These force packages will exercise very little directive, or centralized control over 
subordinate units.  These units will not require or observe strict adherence to standard, 
tactical doctrine and procedures, and will allow subordinate units to adapt their 
operations to the environment as necessary.  Finally, these organizations will be much 
smaller, with fewer subordinate headquarters and a lower ratio of support soldiers to 
combat soldiers. 
Understanding the theoretical range of organizational characteristics possible in 
force packages, and their attendant measurement preferences, requires further  
 
                                                 
27 Jessica Glicken Turnley, Cross Cultural Competence and Small Groups: Why SOF are the way SOF 
are, JSOU Report 11–1, Joint Special Operations University (MacDill Air Force Base: The JSOU Press, 
2011), 47–48. 
28 Jessica Glicken Turnley, Cross Cultural Competence and Small Groups: Why SOF are the way SOF 
are, JSOU Report 11–1, Joint Special Operations University (MacDill Air Force Base: The JSOU Press, 
2011), 47, 52–54. 
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examination and delineation of these measurement types.  The following sections will 
discuss these various measurement forms in order to facilitate an assessment of their 
utility in various forms of conflict. 
D. NODE 3: THE NATURE OF METRICS 
The preceding section argued that different organizational forms demonstrate a 
preference in what and how they measure their progress and success within their 
respective environments.  The study and use of these measurements, increasingly referred 
to as metrics, spans a wide variety of disciplines, which produces an accordingly wide 
variety of ways to define their operative terms and understand their use.  Broadly 
speaking, most works delineate metrics primarily between those that measure activity and 
those that measure effects in the environment.  Whatever disagreement may exist 
regarding the definitions or usefulness of metrics, the military appears committed to 
continue their use, which necessitates clarity in definitions and a thorough understanding 
of their strengths and limitations.   
This section will provide an examination of metrics and conclude by providing a 
differentiation of their type, establish a common vocabulary for use throughout the rest of 
this work, and provide a simplified typology meant to enhance understanding of their 
most important features.  This will facilitate a clearer understanding of their use as well 
as highlight their relative strengths and weaknesses.  From this, the reader will be 
equipped to evaluate the appropriate application of metrics to specific environments in 
the subsequent section.   
1. Defining Metrics 
This work will examine metrics as defined along two dimensions and demonstrate 
their contribution to the goal of measuring progress and success.  Metrics are first 
distinguishable as either quantitative or qualitative in their descriptive form.  Secondly, 
metrics may be distinguished between those that denote activity from those that reflect 
some kind of outcome.  These characteristics are all fundamental elements in illustrating 
progress and success, which is simply an attempt to indicate some degree of progression 
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towards, or regression from, established goals.  Thus, all metrics attempt to provide some 
assessment of progress toward established goals.   
2. Quantitative vs. Qualitative 
Arguably the simplest classification of metrics distinguishes their quantitative and 
qualitative forms.  Quantitative metrics seek to express an observed indicator through 
enumeration.  In considering military metrics, quantification is most often applied when 
assessing a greater or lesser degree of exertion, activities, events, objects, or the passage 
of time.  In quantitative metrics, the relative value attributed to an observed indicator is 
assessed purely as a function of its numerical expression.  Military leaders and planners 
often clearly identify which indicators must be maximized and those that must be 
minimized in order to satisfy the needs of the organization.  Predictably, quantitative 
metrics achieve a great degree of simplicity and parsimony in their analysis and 
interpretation, which affords a great deal of accessibility to the user.  Despite their 
general accessibility, their simplicity considerably limits their descriptive breadth and 
depth when using them to obtain a more thorough understanding of a conflict’s actors and 
the environment.   
Alternatively, qualitative metrics provide a much higher degree of description 
toward a specified indicator.  However, in providing more information, qualitative 
metrics lose the simplicity and accessibility afforded by simple enumeration.  Qualitative 
metrics seek to describe a specified indicator in as much narrative detail as will be 
directed or tolerated by military leadership, and include both verifiable facts and 
subjective interpretation.  Qualitative metrics may describe key observable characteristics 
of people, places, objects, events, and activities, but are necessarily subject to the 
interpretive bias of those responsible for their collection.  For example, a subordinate 
may qualitatively measure security in his area of operations for a given week by 
providing a detailed illustration of observed events and activities with particular emphasis 
on significant changes (positive or negative) in relation to previous weeks or 
expectations.  In this way, the commander’s measurement of security steps beyond a 
simple enumeration of those events and activities that affect an area’s security and 
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provides a much higher degree of detail and context.  The greater breadth and depth 
achieved by this more descriptive and subjective form of measurement naturally entails a 
less succinct reporting format and increases the time required for collection, 
interpretation, and analysis.  
3. Agent Activity vs. Outcomes 
Metrics may be further distinguished between those that assess activity and those 
that reflect outcomes.  Measures that reflect agent activity, more commonly referred to as 
performance, simply express actions taken within the environment in either quantitative 
or qualitative form. This work will deliberately use the term “agent activity,” or 
“activity,” in place of performance as it provides a far more complete and descriptive 
illustration of the characteristic being measured.  By focusing only upon actions taken in 
the environment, measures of activity achieve a high degree of accessibility due to the 
relatively easy manner in which they may be observed, attributed, and reported.  Military 
leaders and commanders most often focus their measurement of activity upon their own 
units and the enemy, but these may be further extended to other important actors in the 
environment as deemed appropriate, such as the activities of non-governmental 
organizations, tribal militias, etc.   
According to organizational theory, an agent’s or organization’s activities may be 
understood in terms of three distinguishable steps.  First, the organization generates 
activity by collecting and applying inputs, most often characterized in terms of personnel, 
resources, and time.29  The organization then conducts some form of internal processing 
whereby these inputs are prepared for application in the environment.30  Finally, the 
organization applies these assets and resources into the environment as outputs with the 
intent of achieving some progress towards its stated goal(s).31  This description of agent 
activity is far more thorough than the more common use of the term “performance” found 
                                                 
29 David E. Hanna, Designing Organizations for High Performance (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley 
Publishing Company, 1988), 11–12. 
30 David E. Hanna, Designing Organizations for High Performance (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley 
Publishing Company, 1988), 12–13. 
31 David E. Hanna, Designing Organizations for High Performance (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley 
Publishing Company, 1988), 13–14. 
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within the military metrics literature.  Within this body of work, the term performance 
tends to imply a narrow emphasis focused only on organizational outputs.  Based upon 
the preceding description, analysis of agent activity does not overly concern itself with 
the effect that an organization’s inputs, internal processes, and outputs yield on its 
environment.  Instead, measurement of agent activity provides members of an 
organization an inward-focused diagnostic review of its systems’ relative efficiency.32 
Measures that reflect outcome, or effect, are far less accessible and more difficult 
to define than metrics of agent activity.  These measures attempt to reflect, with as much 
specificity as possible, changes in the environment in relation to the objectives (or ends) 
sought by the various actors who hold a stake in the conflict’s result.  Most often, military 
leaders tend to frame these measures in terms of their own intended objectives or those of 
the enemy.  However, as described by military analyst David Kilcullen in 
Counterinsurgency, success in the IW conflict often depends upon satisfying the desires 
of other stakeholders as well, especially among the indigenous population.33  
Specifically, outcome-based metrics in IW are most often inextricably linked to abstract 
and conceptual goals that might include achieving an indigenous population’s support, 
improving security conditions, fostering political and economic stability as well as other 
similarly complex ideas.  The complexity inherent in defining the constituent elements of 
each of these abstract goals stipulates that outcome metrics often cannot be assessed 
purely as a direct result of agent activity.  Rather, conducting assessments with outcome 
metrics often requires interpretation over time to identify trends.34  Further, these 
outcomes may be influenced by the unintended or unpredicted results of any and all of an 
organization’s actions in the environment as well as the actions of other heretofore 
ignored actors.  This form of analysis attempts to assess whether an organization’s 
                                                 
32 David E. Hanna, Designing Organizations for High Performance (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley 
Publishing Company, 1988), 14–15.  Here Hanna describes a “negative feedback” system that analyzes and 
compares an organizations outputs to its inputs.  
33 David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 52. 
34  David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 52. 
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activities are adequately addressing the needs of the environment.35  Accordingly, an 
organization’s measurement of outcomes is much more focused outward toward the 
environment and achieving some understanding of the organization’s impact on it. 
4. Metrics Typology 
Figure 3 illustrates the preceding characterization of metrics using their four key 
characteristics.  This figure facilitates some consideration of metric types in terms of their 
accessibility, their descriptive breadth and depth, and their applicability to the 
organizational forms described by Mintzberg.   
 
Figure 3.   Metrics Typology 
5. Implications and Organizational Preferences 
Recalling that measurements of activity and quantitative measurements provide 
the most accessible data, one observes that the top left of the quadrant represents data 
most easily collected by organizations engaged in armed conflict.  Moreover, this form of 
data is arguably the easiest to process in terms of analysis and interpretation.  Collection, 
processing, and analysis of this data does not necessarily require highly trained and 
                                                 
35 David E. Hanna, Designing Organizations for High Performance (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley 
Publishing Company, 1988), 15–16.  Here Hanna describes a “positive feedback” system that analyzes and 
assesses an organization’s ability to address the needs of its environment.   
 26 
skilled personnel with a great depth of understanding of the conflict form engaged upon.  
However, this level of accessibility incurs a cost in terms of its overall descriptive depth 
and breadth.  The scope of this data is exceptionally narrow given its focus on the activity 
of the organization in exclusively quantitative terms.  While useful diagnostically, its use 
in determining an organization’s overall success and progress within the environment 
will be limited based upon the form of conflict considered. 
Organizations, or selected force packages, that reflect the characteristics of 
Mintzberg’s machine bureaucracy will focus the majority of their effort on achieving 
coordinated outputs from its subordinate units.  Specifically, they will emphasize the 
standardization and formalization of work processes in an effort to limit output variation 
and increase the overall predictability of their effort.  Assessing the coordination of 
outputs and attempting to limit variation in output naturally leads these organizations to 
compare the outputs of their subordinate elements against one another.  Coordinating 
these processes, their outputs, and detecting variation among subordinates is most easily 
accomplished by reducing the terms of analysis into enumeration and quantification.  All 
of this reflects a clear inward focus on organizational activity.  Thus, these organizations 
will reflexively analyze their success with an inward, rather than outward, focus in 
assessment.  As such, force packages that behave more like a machine bureaucracy will 
correspondingly demonstrate a dominant preference to assess their success or progress 
with an inward focus using quantitative measures of activity. 
 Conversely, qualitative measures of outcomes, as represented in the top right of 
the figure, present a far less accessible form of data in terms of its collection, processing 
and interpretation.  Qualitative measures of outcomes will include richly detailed sets of 
data provided in descriptive (often narrative) form.  The inherent complexity involved in 
selecting and describing outcomes for the conflict further increases the time and energy 
required for analysis and interpretation of this metric form when considering the 
necessity of analyzing reliability and validity.  While the overall potential for providing 
exceptional descriptive detail is high, this form of data measurement implies the need for 
a high level of expertise, innovativeness and adaptability in order to ensure measures 
remain relevant through the course and development of the conflict.  Accordingly, the 
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individuals responsible for its collection, processing and analysis necessarily require a 
much higher degree of training and skill to focus the effort appropriately and obtain the 
maximum degree of utility from the relatively large amount of data.  The scope of this 
data is significantly wider than that provided by quantitative measures of activity as it 
seeks to describe the organization’s effect within the wider environment rather than an 
inward, diagnostic focus. 
Organizations that reflect the characteristics and behaviors of Mintzberg’s 
Adhocracy are much more focused on the outward environment.  To understand and 
contend with the complexity and instability that characterize their operating environment, 
these organizations achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness by employing an 
operating core that is highly educated and professionalized.36  The increased skill and 
knowledge fosters an expertise among the subordinates that permits and encourages 
building a far more comprehensive understanding of the environment and conflict in 
question.  The high values of education among the individual members enable the 
organization to rely less upon rigid formalization and standardization of behaviors as 
prescribed by the machine bureaucracy.  As experts within their given field, the 
organizations’ leadership is comfortable in relying on the educated judgment of its 
individual members or subordinate elements and thus confer increasing measures of 
autonomy.  This autonomy, in turn, permits the members and subordinate elements to 
devise innovative and adaptive responses to the complexity of their environment and 
implement them as the evolving and dynamic environment requires.  This implies a great 
deal of importance placed on developing a qualitative understanding of the organization’s 
impact on the environment.  All of this reflects a clear outward orientation towards the 
organization’s impact within the environment.  Thus, these organizations will reflexively 
analyze their success with an outward, rather than inward, focus in assessment.  As such, 
force packages that incorporate more of the behaviors associated with Mintzberg’s 
adhocracy will correspondingly demonstrate a dominant preference to assess their 
success or progress with an outward focus using qualitative measures of outcomes. 
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E. NODE 4: APPROPRIATE AND INAPPROPRIATE METRICS FOR IW 
As we have shown in the previous sections, certain organizational structures, 
combined with influences of national imperative, are drawn to certain types of metrics.  
Subsequently, these metrics selected by the organization to evaluate progress will fall 
into two simple categories: appropriate or inappropriate.  Appropriate metrics are those 
that accurately assess the environment and provide critical feedback that prompts the 
necessary actions.  These metrics create a virtuous cycle that begins with understanding 
the environment and leads to the selection of successful courses of action that create 
further positive environmental feedback.  On the other hand, inappropriate metrics can 
have two effects on the military organization.  Some inappropriate metrics simply fail to 
provide an assessment of the environment and provide no benefit to the decision maker.  
However, some inappropriate metrics can also be detrimental to the military organization.  
These metrics provide information that causes the organization to make inaccurate 
assessments of the environment and make decisions that are harmful to the organization.   
In order to determine appropriate metrics, one must first understand the type of 
conflict and its associated environment.   This study defines the mid to high intensity 
conventional warfare environment as simple and stable.  The environment is influenced 
by few external factors that remain fairly consistent overtime, when compared to the 
complexities of the IW environment.  The simplicity of the conventional warfare 
environment involves reasonably explicit objectives articulated in terms of geography, 
assets, and/or enemy capacity to continue fighting.  Furthermore, the few external factors 
allow the military organization to focus on a narrow set of organizational tasks 
distinguished in terms of offense and defense.  In this simple and stable environment, the 
military organization’s standardization and formalization allow it to efficiently focus 
efforts and resources toward the common goal of defeating the enemy.  Conversely, in 
IW the environment is complex due to the increased relevance and significance of many 
diverse elements within the conflict.  Since the ultimate goal of IW is control of a given 
population, virtually every segment of society becomes involved directly or indirectly in 
the conflict.  Additionally, the IW environment is typically unstable as social and 
political changes amongst the population, changes in international influences, and an 
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ever-evolving enemy all synergistically hinder an organization’s ability to react and 
respond accordingly.  Therefore, in the IW environment the military organization is 
unable to rely on standardization and formalization to deal with a narrow set of tasks.  
Instead, the military organization must be dependent on increased mutual adjustment, 
adaptation, and innovation in order to respond appropriately to the broad spectrum of 
actors, situations, and continuous environmental shifts 
As a result, in order to effectively understand the complex and unstable IW 
environment, appropriate metrics should be rooted in measurements of outcomes, and the 
metrics are most effective when qualitative in nature. It is the outcomes, and the detailed 
understanding of how the outcomes were achieved, that allows an organization to use 
metrics to indicate success in IW.  For instance, narratives describing positive working 
relationships with a town mayor, village chief, or tribal sheikh, can serve as qualitative 
measurements at the tactical and operational level to indicate successful efforts.  
Inappropriate metrics in IW are often those that are quantitative in nature and focus on 
measuring agent activity.  However, in conventional warfare, quantitative measurements 
of agent activity can provide suitable metrics for evaluation success.  For example, in 
World War II Allied forces used the metric of tons of bombs dropped on Germany to 
indicate the success of the Allied air campaign in destroying German war-making 
capacity.  This metric can be fairly accurate in gauging success because there is a 
probable correlation between the amount of bombs dropped and the destruction of 
German capabilities.  Thus, in conventional conflicts, quantitative measures of agent 
activity can adequately measure progress and success.   
As shown in Figure 4, the types of metrics required for conventional warfare and 
IW roughly coincide with organizational preferences for metrics mentioned in the 
previous sections.  Thus, one can deduce that in conventional warfare, where the 
environment is comparatively stable and simple; the military organization can develop 
appropriate metrics of success from quantitative measures of agent activity.  In IW, 
where the environment is more complex and unstable, the military organization needs to 
rely on metrics derived from qualitative measures of outcomes in order to best evaluate 
progress and success.  
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Figure 4.   Organizational and Environmental Influence on Appropriate Metrics 
Figure 5 depicts an example of appropriate and inappropriate metrics for 
evaluating true effectiveness in IW.  In this example, the metrics are arranged in typical 
focus groups of economics, governance, and security.  However, it is important to note 
that based on the nature of the IW conflict, these focus groups and their constituent 
metrics can vary.  Regardless, the appropriate metrics depicted in the figure are 
qualitative and outcome based examples that often reflect progress in IW.  For instance, 
the growth of small businesses and the increase of elements of civil society may be 
indicators that the actions of a military organization toward stability and winning 
population support are effective.  However, measurements like body count are typically 
extraneous information that provides no real benefit toward depicting effectiveness in 
winning the support of the population.  Likewise, relying on measurements of enemy 
significant activities (SIGACTs) can be counter-effective to the military organization in 
IW.  Just because an area has very few SIGACTs does not mean that the enemy is weak 
and the population supports our efforts.  The area could actually have low SIGACTs 




organization.  Thus, the metric of SIGACTs and other inappropriate metrics could be 
misguiding to the military organization and may result in decisions detrimental to 
operations.   
 
Figure 5.   Appropriate vs. Inappropriate Metrics 
However, simply relying on any outcome based metrics in IW will not always 
predict progress, as the appropriate metrics for identifying success in IW vary with the 
conflict.  The IW environment is full of uncertainty, as decision makers consistently have 
difficulty determining the critical information about the environment, and thus have 
difficulty predicting environmental changes.37  As a result, decision makers try to 
measure all aspects of the environment, compiling volumes of metrics, surveys, and other 
statistical data.38  This typically leads to information overload, as the military 
organization is unable to analyze all of the data.  In order to successfully process the 
massive amount of information in a manner that is coherent, reliable, and useful, the 
military organization must be capable of selecting which aspects of the environment are 
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relevant and applicable to quantifying success and progress.  However, the information 
that is relevant is constantly changing as the conflict progresses, and is not always 
applicable for different conflicts.  For example, improvements in infrastructure and 
restoration of civil services may have been an ideal measurement tool in one instance, 
while security and attack rates best informed another.   The USMC concept of the Three 
Block War captures the metrics quandary perfectly, as what makes a Marine successful 
on one block has no relevance to his or her success or failure on the adjacent street.  
Additionally, as Bernard Fall describes, “If it works, it is obsolete.”39   Thus, 
understanding the environment, selecting the appropriate outcome-based metrics, and 
being able to change those metrics as the environment changes is critical for adapting 
strategy and operations toward overcoming the enemy, winning population support, and 
achieving success. 
F. METHODOLOGY 
From the causal chain described above, we developed the hypotheses listed 
below: 
 1. If an IW mission has a high national imperative, then the military 
organization will focus on measurements of agent activity 
 2. If an IW conflict has high national imperative, then policymakers 
influence will increase the machine bureaucratic tendencies of the military organization 
 3. If an IW conflict has low national imperative, then military 
organizations will have the latitude to develop the appropriate metrics for evaluating 
success and progress 
 4. If the organization conducting IW has machine bureaucratic tendencies, 
then the organization will rely on quantitative measurements 
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 5. If the machine bureaucracy of the military increases in IW, then the 
military’s focus will be on measurements of agent activity 
 6. If the organization in IW judges its progress more on measurements of 
outcomes, then the organization will be more successful 
 7. An increase in the reliance on qualitative measurements will result in 
improved environmental understanding and thus increased success in IW 
  This study will focus on exploring hypotheses 1, 2, 4, and 5.  In order to 
test these hypotheses, the congruence procedure will be employed.40 This method 
provides the means to demonstrate the influences on metrics development process 
through cross sectional case studies.  Based on the consistency of the results of this type 
of assessment the cases will reveal a degree of congruence based on “similarities in the 
relative strength and duration of the hypotheses’ causes and observed effects.”41   The 
case studies will focus on the American involvement in the Greek Civil War, the Vietnam 
War, and Operation Iraqi Freedom.  We selected these cases because they provide 
variance in national imperative and selected force packages.  The case studies will 
explore these IW conflicts in terms of how metrics were generated and employed, and 
how their application affected the conduct and results of events.  Through a systematic 
and consistent evaluation of the selected cases in the format described below, it is 
possible to identify how and to what degree the hypotheses apply to each case.    
1.  Historical Narrative 
Each case study will provide a historical narrative of the selected event.  In this 
manner the case can be summarized and focused on the relevant factors.  Additionally, as 
IW campaigns can be protracted affairs, the narrative will bound discussion in each case 
to those factors relevant to the development and employment of metrics. 
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2. Historical Context 
To understand the context of each case, the description will begin with a summary 
of the historical context of the IW conflict.  This will frame the event or the selected 
portion of a larger conflict in a manner that places the analysis in the context of the 
external factors that influenced how the IW campaign was prosecuted.  By understanding 
historical context and the relevant factors generated by external stakeholders and 
antecedent conditions, relevant influences on the causal chain can be fully addressed. 
3. National Imperative 
Once the context and timeline of the conflict has been established the case study 
will discuss the influence of national imperative on the IW conflict.  Important political 
and or social events will be identified that indicate the degree of National Imperative 
associated with the conflict.  These events should further indicate the explicit and implicit 
demands of the internal and external stakeholders involved as well as the influences these 
demands pass down to the military organization.  
4. Military Organization 
Military organizational assessment will follow the national imperative discussion 
and address the manner in which national imperative shaped the force package selected.  
This portion will also analyze how stakeholder demands generate requirements to 
measure success and progress.  The tenants of Organizational Theory presented 
previously will be used to articulate how the military force selected conducts the IW 
mission and displays tendencies that influence how metrics for the conflict were 
constructed.   
5. Nature of Metrics 
After evaluating the force package, stakeholder requirements, and organizational 
tendencies, the case study will focus on identifying how the metrics selected fit the 
hypotheses.  By evaluating the organizational tendencies exhibited toward measuring 
agent activity versus measuring outcomes, the unique nature of metrics in a given conflict 
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will be presented.  This section will illustrate the organizational preferences of the 
military organization and the degree to which the quantitative or qualitative 
measurements were employed and weighted by stakeholders.  This will facilitate an 
assessment of the degree to which the military agent displayed the preferences identified 
by organizational theory.   
6. Appropriate/Inappropriate Metrics in IW 
As the metrics employed in a given case are established, the case study will then 
assess the suitability of these measurements.  Each case study will conclude that the 
metrics employed in the conflict were appropriate or inappropriately selected based off 
the military organization’s ability to effectively interpret the IW environment.  By 
establishing the significance of appropriate and inappropriate metrics in a given conflict 
the efforts to measure success and progress can be assessed as a productive process that 
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III. THE GREEK CIVIL WAR 
The case of the Greek Civil War (GCW) demonstrates the employment of 
specifically designed military organizations assigned to conduct IW. The manner in 
which the American advisors structured their force to weigh measures of performance 
and outcomes influenced the success of the Greek National Army as a representative of 
the free world as efforts to deter communism and support democracies following World 
War II became the new priority for American foreign policy.  The manner in which this 
IW conflict was conducted and evaluated illustrates the value of understanding the 
environment, stakeholder interests and methods of assessment.  The Greek Civil War 
demonstrates the results of effective prioritization of emphasis and qualitative 
assessment.  The American Advisor effort in the GCW embodies the success of 
qualitative metrics to assess the environment, validated by appropriately weighted 
quantitative measures. 
A. HISTORICAL NARRATIVE 
Civil War erupted in Greece at the conclusion of World War II as the nation 
struggled to define itself in the wake of the power vacuum created by the occupation and 
subsequent liberation from the Axis Powers.  During the war British Special Operations 
Executive (SOE) supported a number of resistance groups in Greece.  These groups 
included elements of the previous regime referred to Royalists, the Monarchists, a de 
facto action arm of the government in exile and new groups like  the Communist Party of 
Greece (Kommounistiko Komma Elladas or KKE) and their militant arm known as the 
National Liberation Front (Ethniko Apeleftherotiko Metopo or EAM).42  Royalist and 
Monarchist groups advocated a return to the pre-war democratic form of government 
opposed the KKE, and acted against the occupiers independent of the communists.  By 
liberation the Greek nation was economically destitute following the withdrawal of the 
Axis Powers.  Tension escalated into open conflict between resistance groups divided by 
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ideology and made desperate by economic conditions. All sides had been supported by 
the SOE throughout the conflict, the Royalists had not only expended their resources in 
active opposition against their occupiers, they had also failed to organize to the degree 
the communist resistance groups had.  The KKE was well organized, had stockpiled 
much of the material support they received from Britain while receiving additional 
support and safe haven from communist entities in Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria 
following the end of the War.43  The post war elections in March of 1946 were 
supervised by the dwindling British security forces and established the Royalists as the 
legitimate government in post war Greece. Disputing the results, the communist 
oppositions groups revolted, and the Greek Civil War reignited into open conflict.44  
EAM was reinvented as the Democratic Army of Greece (Dimoskratikos Stratos Ellados) 
or DAG.45 
American involvement in the GCW began in 1947 with the announcement of an 
aid package to stabilize Europe through a series of loans and supplies.  In a speech to a 
joint session of Congress on 12 March, 1947, President Truman announced a total of four 
hundred million dollars of aid to Greece and Turkey in an effort to support those 
governments in the wake of the British announcement that as of 31 March of that year 
they would no longer continue to support their allies due to pressing financial concerns.46  
In 1947, Lieutenant General James Van Fleet was assigned as the leader of American 
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State George Marshall that the scope of the initial logistical support could not provide  
what was truly needed; the expertise to bolster the combat capability of the Greek 
Army.47   
A full military advisory establishment, the Joint United States Military 
Advisory and Planning Group (JUSMAPG) on 31 December 1947, 
replaced the U.S. Army Group-Greece (USAGG). From that time, U.S. 
Army advisers went into the field with combat forces with a mandate to 
provide “aggressive assistance in the form of operational and logistic 
advice.48  
Van Fleet focused on the state of the Greek officer corps rather than specific terrain or 
enemy based operations.  His efforts and that of his advisors sought to provide the Greek 
military with the ability to develop competent units to defeat the communist guerrilla 
forces, which established firm control of Greece’s mountainous northern regions.  The 
initial assessment revealed that the Greek military lacked capacity and that “combat 
readiness and troop morale of Greek units were even worse than had been reported.”49   
With heavy American influence at the operational level and a strong emphasis on 
officer leadership and individual combat skills across the military, the Greek Army soon 
began to achieve small successes against communist forces.  In small operations 
beginning on 15 April 1948, engagements against guerrilla elements were decidedly 
positive.  During an offensive in Roumeli, the DAG suffered its first operational defeat 
while the Greek Army showed a marked improvement in planning and execution.50  
Following this success the American advisors turned to a much more ambitious target, 
the communist center of gravity in the Grammos Mountains.  Terrain around the 
communist stronghold in Grammos was formidable, so much so that the DAG openly 
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declared their redoubt as an “impregnable fort” and confidently began to reinforce their 
positions for the inevitable assault.  By the time Operation Crown, the mission to take 
Grammos, was initiated in mid-June, the communists had nearly ten thousand troops 
defending the area. The defenders included reinforcements from communist groups in 
Albania and whole battalions of DAG reinforcements brought from across the country in 
hopes of defending the mountain fortress.51  This dramatic shift from guerrilla tactics, 
which to this point had served to highlight the Greek Army’s inability to provide security 
in the rural north, was the opportunity the American advisors sought.52  Operation 
Crown, the largest operation of the war to that point, saw the Greek Army achieve a 
methodical series of successes against a well-armed and heavily fortified enemy in a 
region that mitigated the advantages of aerial and artillery capabilities.53  The operation 
was extremely taxing, and during the six week campaign General Van Fleet personally 
relieved several senior Greek officers for failing to be sufficiently aggressive.54  Despite 
the challenges, Grammos was taken and the surviving DAG elements were forced into 
full retreat to their safe havens of Albania.55  The perception of this victory validated 
General Van Fleet’s focus on professionalizing the Greek Army, but illustrated that there 
was much work left to do.  Throughout the fall, DAG forces infiltrated new parts of 
Greece along the Greek-Yugoslav border had resumed guerrilla tactics with considerable 
success. During this period, the Greek senior military leadership repeatedly proved far 
too passive.  Eventually, Van Fleet and his advisors secured the authority to force 
retirement upon several senior Greek officers who failed to perform.56    
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Throughout the winter of 1948, American advisors focused on training the 
quickly expanding Greek Army units, while facilitating the integration of American 
material support that further improved the comparative advantage the Greek Army 
enjoyed over their communist adversaries.  The DAG resurfaced rapidly however, and 
atrocities in the rural regions became more common resulting in the communists losing 
popular support and forcing them to resort to kidnapping recruits and raiding Greek 
towns for supplies.  In early 1949, Operation Pigeon cleared the Peloponnese islands of 
DAG forces, largely destroying communist resistance efforts in the southern region of 
Greece and further validating the newly increased capacity of the Greek Army.  Greek 
units were becoming more responsive, acting quicker at all levels, and tactically 
destroying guerrilla forces in battles that were becoming increasingly one sided.   
In 1949 three significant changes in the environment brought an end to the Greek 
Civil War.  First, increasingly competent Greek Army units were becoming more 
aggressive, led by officers selected and trained by the American Advisors.  These new 
leaders replaced senior leaders identified as the most significant deficiency of the Greek 
Army. Bolstered with new equipment from America, increased technical expertise and 
more aggressive leadership, the Army was developing rapidly.   
Second, the communist guerrillas still enjoyed limited freedom of movement and 
had the ability to mass and attack remote villages to kidnap recruits and supplies, and 
intimidate the populace.   In June of 1949 a joint initiative between the Greek Army, the 
Constabulary and the JUSMAPG began a village defense initiative to allow villages to 
defend themselves.57  The move was highly controversial, but early successes on a 
limited scale quickly validated the concept.  In addition to denying the insurgent elements 
resources, the initiative increased credibility and legitimacy of the Greek government in 
regions where social fissures led to a highly polarized population that saw the communist 
attacks as implicit evidence of the government’s lack of concern for certain regions and 
ethnic groups.  The village defense initiative also solved, to some extent, the Greek 
Army’s most significant operational challenge of securing contested regions. 
                                                 
57 Paul F. Braim, The Will to Win: The Life of General James A. Van Fleet (Annapolis, MD: Naval 
Institute Press, 2001), 210. 
 42 
 Finally, external factors associated with the emerging Cold War doomed the 
Greek communists when the Soviet Union broke of ties with Tito of Yugoslavia and 
directed Albania and Bulgaria to cease their support and safe haven.  The DAG became a  
victim of the escalating tensions between Washington and Moscow as Stalin saw the 
danger in overt support to communist revolutions in nations allied directly to America 
and Western Europe.   
Operation Torch, initiated on 10 August 1949, was intended to end the war by 
destroying the remaining communist guerrilla elements.  With several divisions 
maneuvering, the Greek Army spent the remainder of the month seizing key terrain, 
clearing previously contested areas throughout northern Greece and isolating remaining 
resistance units to avoid their retreat into their historical cross border safe havens.  
Following Operation Torch, smaller operations continued through the rest of the year. 
The bitter winter and lack of material support doomed the guerrillas.  By mid-1950 the 
Greek Army demobilized and JUSMAPG ended its mission.   In a 1950 editorial, The 
Washington Star summarized the victory succinctly: 
It looks as though the calculated risk which President Truman decided to 
take in Greece is beginning to pay real dividends.  The decision was made, 
the stand was taken, the difficulties were overcome by patience and hard 
work, and the onward march of communism in that part of the world was 
stopped.58 
B. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
Two aspects of the Greek Civil War are highly significant in the context of the 
use of metrics in IW.  First, an understanding of the enemy illuminates how the tactics 
employed by the advisors fit the situation.  Second, the external stakeholder influence on 
the conflict must be considered as it illustrates the ways and means available to the 
JUSMAG advisors.  These unique aspects of the GCW facilitate an assessment of how 
metrics influenced the conflict. 
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The DAG was an insurgent movement that held its roots in Greek communist 
resistance groups formed in the Second World War.  The DAG was not a “popular” 
insurgent group and thus did not enjoy the luxury of being “part-time guerrillas.”  Most 
of the fighters had been subjected to intense re-education in safe havens away from 
Greece, and once in the field, lived as a military unit unattached to the people in the 
region.  This ideological and familial dissonance allowed the Greek government to frame 
the communists as criminals and referred to their organizations as “bandits.”  This image 
was reinforced as the guerrillas terrorized the populace for supplies, kidnapped recruits, 
and killed local leaders.  The stark separation between the populace and the insurgent 
elements ensured the DAG could not “hide in plain sight” among the villages like 
population based insurgencies in history.  Additionally, the DAG was highly organized 
and sought to formalize its structure, assigning unit designations and complex chains of 
command to the disparate elements.  The DAG was organized as a conventional infantry 
army, with divisions, brigades, and battalions, and standardized equipment down to 
platoon mortars and crew served weapons.59  An illustration of this was following the 
major defeat in the Grammos Mountains where the DAG massed its available combat 
power in a failed attempt to repel the Greek Army.  At this critical period, the leader of 
the DAG military, Markos Vaifides, was removed from the organization in a bitter 
internal struggle.  A committed, Moscow educated, life-long communist, Markos saw the 
situation for what it was and had advocated for a higher degree of decentralization.  
Following their narrow escape from a massive defeat in Operation Crown, Markos was 
deposed from his position of leadership by the KKE president, Nikolas Zacharidas, for 
the military failure in the Grammos.  The irony of this internal struggle lay in the 
perceptions of Zacharidas himself who, in a state of delusion, couldn’t reconcile the 
reality of the DAG military inferiority with his own dogma rooted in the false logic that 
the communist forces were still the single most capable military element in Greece, as 
they had been in the waning days of 1945.  Sharply critical of Marcos’s guerrilla tactics 
throughout the campaign “Zacharidas published an article in the underground DAG 
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magazine, The Democratic Army, in which he advocated reshaping the guerrilla force 
along conventional lines.”60  This notion certainly found no objection from the Greek 
Army or JUSMAPG, which welcomed every opportunity to prove the fallacy of 
Zacharidas’s perspective and meet the insurgents in conventional battle where their 
superior training, equipment and capabilities could be brought to bear.61  Additionally, 
Zacharidas’s conventional focus further separated the insurgents from the populace, thus 
aiding the Greek Army and JUSMAPG in winning the overarching IW fight. 
A second driving factor in the GCW happened far removed from the state or 
counter state order of battle.  The western Allies were aware of the growing menace of 
communist expansion but neither they nor Moscow had clearly identified a strategy for 
foreign policy in the newly polarized post-war world order.  The U.S. developed the 
Marshall Plan and Truman Doctrine, which rapidly transformed how America would 
interact with her allies. Conversely, Stalin espoused the glories of revolution worldwide 
and universal Soviet support to oppressed people everywhere.  In reality, both sides were 
exhausted from the massive price of defeating the Axis powers.  While Washington and 
Moscow sought to consolidate their power in the new environment, Greece became a test 
bed for their foreign policies and an experiment to determine how invested each nation 
was in the burgeoning ideological struggle between western democracy and communism. 
 C. NATIONAL IMPERATIVE 
The JUSMAPG mission in the GCW held a low national priority for a variety of 
reasons.  The reasons revolved around developing national priorities, and how American 
foreign policy would progress in the post war era.  Secretary of State Marshall 
understood that Greece and Turkey represented the first of many future contentious 
foreign aid and military endeavors to oppose communism.  The Marshall Plan for all of 
Europe was hotly disputed, so much so that some congressional leaders who wanted a 
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more isolationist approach took to defaming General Marshall directly.  Senator William 
Jenner of Indiana was perhaps the most virulent stating: 
General Marshall is not only willing, he is eager to play the role of a front 
man, for traitors.  Unless he, himself (Marshall) were desperate, he could 
not possibly agree to continue as an errand boy, front man, stooge or a co-
conspirator for this administration’s crazy assortment of collectivist 
cutthroat crackpots and Communist fellow traveling appeasers.62   
The direct opposition to the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan was mostly 
due to the associated costs and a hesitancy to be overly involved with world affairs 
following WWII.  The national consciousness was only beginning to become aware of 
what life, as one of two ideologically opposing superpowers, would be like.  JUSMAPG 
was simply too minor to draw strong national interest in relation to other matters at hand.   
The scope of JUSMAPG’s mission was indicative of the low national imperative 
it held.  After WWII, advising was simply not considered as important as active ground 
combat.  The support mission was viewed as exactly that, a military expression of the 
other financial and government support going on through Europe at the time.  
Policymakers were not invested in the immediate success of the mission; support to the 
Greek government was enough, especially if costs and casualties were kept relatively 
low.  
Despite the lack of national level attention from the American people and national 
level leaders, President Truman recognized the significance of Greece and resolved to 
act, as he recorded in his memoirs: 
Greece needed aid, and needed it quickly and in substantial amounts.  The 
alternative was the loss of Greece and the extension of the Iron Curtain 
across the eastern Mediterranean.  If Greece were lost, Turkey would 
become an untenable outpost in a sea of Communism.63 
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Despite the opposition and general national disinterest, JUSMAPG was formed as 
a means to meet President Truman and Secretary Marshall’s intent, with no timetable for 
success or driving national imperative to succeed immediately.   
In discussing national imperative and the effects of metrics, the low national 
imperative allowed for less focus on measurements of agent.  The lack of pressure to 
achieve immediate results allowed JUSMAPG to evaluate the situation and measure 
success and progress based on the environmental conditions that the organization faced, 
rather than in an internal manner that would produce a rapid quantifiable response to 
demands for success.  The result was illustrative of the relationship between national 
imperative and immediate assessment, demonstrating that the metrics JUSMAPG 
selected allowed the time and latitude to select a combination of measures that articulated 
the state of the environment in post–WWII Greece. 
D. U.S. MILITARY ORGANIZATION IN THE GREEK CIVIL WAR 
The initial manning of JUSMAPG was ninety-nine officers and eighty soldiers.  
This miniscule force was only assigned down to the division level in the Greek Army and 
Hellenic Royal Navy and Air Force.  By 1948 the number expanded to 400 total advisors, 
refocused by JUSMAPG directive to the combat divisions with an emphasis on those 
units conducting ground operations.  While the advisors were not allowed to carry 
weapons of any kind, they were expected to accompany their counterparts into battle.  
The weapons status was meant as provision to ensure that these advisors were assisting 
rather than commanding.  Despite this, the 182 advisors in direct combat during 
Operation Crown appear to have armed themselves in dire situations and even assumed 
command of company-sized elements in the most heated moments of the battle to capture 
the DAG stronghold in the Grammos Mountains.64   
LTG Van Fleet maintained a continuous emphasis on combat leadership and 
individual and unit proficiency throughout the GCW.  He organized his JUSMAPG force 
to best accomplish this developmental process.  With advisors embedded at the tactical, 
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operational and strategic level JUSMAPG could assess the changes in Greek capability as 
well as supervise the planning and execution of their operations.  This force structure was 
critical because the advisors were intimately involved with the development and training 
of new Greek units.  This requirement to supervise the initial training of Greek soldiers, 
many of them conscripts, and then accompany them into the fight led to a blend of 
metrics for the evaluation of each effort.  JUSMAPG employed a variety of metrics to 
measure results, including both measures of effectiveness and activity in addition to 
outcomes that articulated success and progress of the Greek forces.  
The force package selected for the GCW was an example of appropriate fit and 
flexibility, as demonstrated by the transition from exclusively material support, which 
was initially offered, to American military advisors who influenced the course of the war.  
The Greek monarchy may have had the most significant influence on this process.  When 
the Greek Army was acting unilaterally, Queen Frederika herself asked Secretary 
Marshall for combat advisors, confirming initial reports that equipment alone was 
insufficient based on the inability of Greek military leadership at all levels.65  After an 
assessment by the Joint Chiefs concurred with the Greek monarch, JUSMAPG was 
formed and combat advisors became the main effort.   
From inception, JUSMAPG balanced quantitative and qualitative assessments of 
success and progress.  For the JUSMAPG commander, the qualitative measurements 
became of paramount importance.  Upon his initial meeting with Marshall to receive the 
assignment, LTG Van Fleet was asked if the conflict held even a possibility of success 
for the Greek government. Van Fleet’s response summarized his philosophy for 
evaluating the qualitative aspects of his new assignment. He stated that if the Greeks had 
“the will to win” he could train them to be victorious.66  Van Fleet echoed this sentiment 
as he articulated his philosophy for JUSMAPG to Marshal Alexander Papagos, the Greek 
senior commander installed in the 1948 change of leadership.  In correspondence to 
Papagos that he also relayed to Washington, Van Fleet stated: 
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Guerrilla warfare is without doubt the most difficult in which any military 
force can engage… The combat value of a unit is determined in great 
measure by the soldierly qualities of its leaders and members and its will 
to fight.67 
This command emphasis on the qualitative style of reporting illustrates that 
JUSMAPG was able to articulate its success and progress beyond measuring agent 
activity, which in this case would be enumeration of actions performed by the advisors 
themselves.  Certainly, quantitative measurements of both U.S. advisor and Greek Army 
activity were employed and reported but the emphasis remained on achieving success 
through enabling the Greeks to improve their capacity to defeat the communists as 
assessed qualitatively.  This allowed significant latitude for the advisors on the ground, 
and in that manner avoided an inward focus that would have been detrimental.  As the 
criteria for success was the quality of the Greek forces rather than the actions of 
JUSMAPG itself, the organizational tendencies reflected a focus on outcomes.  While 
maintaining a clear structure, JUSMAPG did not overly standardize and formalize 
processes.  The reporting required of JUSMAPG advisors, and what LTG Van Fleet in 
turn reported to national leadership was indicative of the organizational principles of 
professionalism, mutual adjustment and innovation, relying on the professional opinion 
of advisors to describe events in narrative form to articulate the state of the environment 
and the status of the conflict. 
E. THE NATURE OF METRICS  
With organizational preferences that empowered qualitative assessment, the 
JUSMAPG effort in the GCW clearly favored measuring outcomes.  This is not to say 
that measures that quantified activities were not employed.  JUSMAPG paid close 
attention to the numbers it produced, or more appropriately, the numbers the Greek Army 
produced under JUSMAPG guidance.  In training environments, the numbers of new 
recruits trained was reported in great detail to JUSMAPG headquarters and on to 
Washington, but the emphasis remained on ensuring quality training and increased 
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baseline competency of the Greek rifleman and junior leader to address the concerns 
JUSMAPG had regarding the general incompetence of Greek soldiers.  In operations, 
effects on enemy forces were tallied in exacting detail, and the number of enemy killed 
and captured became a key statistic reported to President Truman.  The appropriateness 
of these quantitative measurements will be discussed in the next section.   
Qualitative measurements, especially of Greek units and their commanders were 
emphasized from the highest level of JUSMAPG.  The advisors routinely assessed the 
strengths and weaknesses of their counterparts and made replacing inept or timid 
commanders a top priority.  This assessment was determined by the unit’s actions in 
battle and by the evaluation of the advisor on the ground.  The actions of the Greeks were 
what mattered to JUSMAPG commanders, not the processes and actions taken by the 
advisors.  In this manner, the qualitative assessment became the organizational tool to 
evaluate the environment.  Outward focus is detailed in the reporting process as 
JUSMAPG provided weekly, monthly and quarterly reports to the external stakeholders 
in the Greek government and back to national policymakers in Washington.   
JUSMAPG demonstrated adhocratic organizational tendencies throughout the 
GCW.  The outward focus on the war effort and the status and capability of the Greek 
Army allowed for assessments that drew conclusions from the environment, rather than 
the activity performed by the advisors.  The ability to avoid machine bureaucracy limited 
the amount of emphasis on quantitative measurements.  These measurements were used 
to gauge effects on the environment rather than evaluate agent activity, demonstrating the 
ability to employ qualitative assessment when an organization is not inhibited by an over 
reliance on the tendencies of a machine bureaucracy.  Avoiding tendencies that resemble 
a machine bureaucracy, the JUSMAPG mission was able to focus outward on effects in 
the environment rather than agent activity.  This is also demonstrated by the JUSMAPG 
performance in terms of hypothesis five, stating that if machine bureaucracy increases in 
IW then the military organization will shift to evaluating quantitative assessments of 
agent activity.  Even when JUSMAPG expanded, there was still focus on qualitative 
measurements, indicating that even with numerical growth, the bureaucratic tendencies of 
the organization did not shift. 
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F. APPROPRIATE/INAPPROPRIATE METRICS IN THE GREEK CIVIL 
WAR 
To assess if the quantitative metrics employed in the GCW were appropriate, it is 
critical to understand the nature of the environment, particularly the enemy disposition.  
Since the DAG was hierarchically organized and did not benefit from large popular 
support the combat power of the insurgency was quantifiable in ways not typically 
available to counterinsurgent forces engaged in IW.   In this manner, the DAG forces 
could be assessed in terms of modern military intelligence assessments, which enabled 
generally accurate intelligence to be predictive of their disposition, composition, and 
strength.  In Operations Crown and Pigeon the quantitative assessments of enemy killed 
and captured was a generally accurate indicator of success because the enemy was 
structured in a manner that accommodated such measurements.  In a more popular 
insurgency with decentralized insurgent structure, these results would not have been as 
telling.  The quantifiable measurements of Greek Army activity in combat did serve a 
purpose in this case.  The JUSMAPG reports to Washington summarized enemy killed 
and captured as well as Greek Army activity in geographic and numerical quantification, 
all of which served a purpose when empowered by insightful assessment by the authors 
who could relay the context of what the numerical assessments indicated.  In this manner, 
the quantitative measurements reported in the GCW were appropriate because they 
served to illustrate JUSMAPG priorities, and articulated in a manner that was reflective 
of the state of the environment.  Also significant about this case of qualitative measures 
in IW is that these metrics were employed to inform the assessment of qualitative 
priorities, not as stand-alone indicators of success or failure. 
The qualitative measures of effectiveness that JUSMAPG favored were 
appropriate for the GCW.  The Greek Army and American advisors benefited from the 
status of the DAG in Greece.  Separated ideologically and often physically from the 
populace, the DAG had limited means to advance their position except through armed 
conflict, which became less and less tenable as the war progressed.  JUSMAPG was able 
focus outward, assess its partners, and develop the capacity needed to find, fix and finish 
a dwindling enemy army.   Detailed professional assessments of Greek Army leadership 
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and skills were the best way to ensure success on the battlefield by providing the advisors 
the latitude to articulate the situation in both training and in combat. 
G. CONCLUSION 
JUSMAPG benefitted from a variety of circumstances that enabled its 
measurements to be effective in the Greek Civil War.  The low U.S. national imperative 
allowed the organization latitude to develop the Greek Army over time, and to shape 
missions and training without time constraints from external stakeholders.  Additionally, 
the military organization was allowed to be flexible and adaptive, and built to fit the 
situation on the ground.  Compared to other American IW conflicts, where combat units 
structured for conventional conflict must adapt their organizational tendencies in an 
attempt to meet the challenges of IW, JUSMAPG was built for the mission in Greece. 
The circumstances of the war also favored the advisors as the DAG actions and 
policies prevented them from employing several tactics that in other cases would benefit 
an insurgent force.  The advisors were successful in meeting the requirement of 
increasing Greek capacity to a level where they could defeat their enemy, rather than 
subdue an entire region or police the populous.  Because JUSMAPG could afford to 
focus on the Greek Army relative to the DAG the advisors could employ years of 
conventional combat and training experience garnered in WWII.  This experience is what 
provided the expertise necessary for the critical assessments and qualitative reporting that 
was the key measurement of success and progress. 
It must also be said that DAG suffered from a dramatic loss of external support 
following Stalin’s decision that supporting the Greek communists was no longer in the 
best interests of the Soviet Union.  The early stages of the Cold War and directives from 
the U.S.S.R to Bulgaria and Albania eventually ensured that the DAG was on its own, 




In summary, the JUSMAPG experience is an illustration of qualitative 
assessments effectively employed in IW.  The advisors were not Special Forces, cultural 
experts, or native speakers.  They were, however, professional soldiers who were able to 
achieve success because they were enabled by their chain of command to build capacity 
against an adversary who had lost external support.  By articulating an approach focused 
on quality leadership, teaching decisive action at all levels, and aggressiveness, the 
advisors succeeded in their mission. Measuring those qualities was the result of 
qualitative assessments, articulated in a manner no measurement of agent activity could 
capture.  The Greek Civil War was an irregular conflict that demonstrated the potential of 
qualitative assessment, patience, and understanding in evaluating the environment. 
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IV. U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM 1965–1968 
Any examination of the U.S. military’s development and use of metrics in IW 
requires an analysis of its involvement in Vietnam for two primary purposes.  First, the 
protracted and bitter struggle to assert political control over the nation’s population 
between competing Vietnamese factions represents the essence of IW conflict as 
conceived in military doctrine and literature.  Second, the increasing degree and duration 
of American military participation in this Vietnamese struggle, from its beginnings 
through the consolidation of Communist control, appropriately marks this case among the 
most significant historical instances of U.S. military involvement in IW.  
While the U.S. military’s involvement in the Vietnam conflict spanned nearly 25 
years and five presidential administrations, this study focuses exclusively upon the period 
between 1965 and 1968.  This time interval represents America’s fullest commitment in 
the conflict, extending U.S. military control over the operational environment to such an 
extent that it intentionally minimized the contribution of indigenous forces.   
With these conditions in place, the effects of the U.S. national imperative toward 
Vietnam conflict, the organizational behaviors and characteristics of the U.S. military, 
and their combined impact on the development and use of metrics reach their fullest 
expression.  Correspondingly, conclusions drawn from this period yield greater insight 
into how and why the military chose its criteria for assessing its progress.   
We selected this case because the national imperative of the conflict reached its 
highest peak among the public and political leadership following significant events in 
1964.  With this high degree of imperative, the size of the military force package 
increased substantially, which accordingly increased the organization’s machine 
bureaucratic tendencies. Combined, these two developments influenced the force 
package’s development and application of inappropriate measurements for IW, which 
further obscured its understanding of the environment and the root causes of the conflict.  
Thus, the military force package proved unable to overcome the pressures imposed by the 
high national imperative and its organizational characteristics.   
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To assess this chain of events, the case study will provide a brief historical 
narrative summarizing the U.S. military’s involvement in Vietnam in order to provide 
greater context for the selected time interval under examination.  Following this 
summary, the study will highlight important contextual details that pertain to the time 
period selected and then proceed to outline and highlight historical examples that 
illustrate the degree of national imperative, the type of organizational force package 
selected, and the assessments it developed and employed. 
A. HISTORICAL NARRATIVE 
In stark contrast to the eventual commitment of over 500,000 personnel by 1968, 
America’s military involvement in Vietnam began modestly in 1950 with a small 
contingent providing assistance and advisement to French forces attempting to reassert 
their colonial control after WWII.  Over its nearly 25-year commitment, the U.S. 
military’s role, efforts, and organization shifted dramatically as events in Vietnam, the 
region, and the United States influenced political and popular opinion about the conflict. 
1. Phase I – Early Advisory Years, 1950–1955 
Significant U.S. military involvement in Vietnam after WWII began under the 
Truman administration with the establishment of a small Military Advisory and 
Assistance Group (MAAG) focused primarily on assisting the French in their struggle to 
regain control of their former colonial holding.68  While the French largely dismissed the 
advisory component of this small contingent, it gladly accepted U.S. funding and 
equipment, given the rapidly growing costs of the conflict and its post–WWII 
reconstruction obligations.69  Despite this frustrating relationship with the French, several 
significant events shaped U.S. political and popular concerns about the Far East and 
South East Asia, and thus reinforced U.S. support and investment in Vietnam.   
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The relatively recent victory of the Chinese Communists over the Nationalists in 
late 1949 reinforced existing United States’ fears of global communist expansion 
masterminded by the Soviet Union.70  North Korea’s invasion of South Korea in the 
summer of 1950 and the subsequent participation by Communist Chinese forces further 
heightened these concerns and increased U.S. commitment to countering communist 
influence around the world, albeit with greater emphasis on Western Europe.71  While the 
termination of hostilities in Korea during the summer of 1953 stopped combat casualties, 
the U.S. perceived this turn of events as providing China a greater opportunity to support 
their communist neighbors in North Vietnam.  Finally, France’s devastating loss at Dien 
Bien Phu, the subsequent signing of the Geneva Accords, and the beginning of French 
disengagement from Vietnam forced the U.S. to make a decision on the value of South 
East Asia and the imminence of the communist threat.72    
However, as much as the U.S. sought to avoid involvement in another war 
following the conclusion of WWII and Korea, the cumulative effect of this series of 
events prompted a strong, and growing, national imperative for action.  This national 
imperative would continue to grow in the subsequent phases of U.S. involvement during 
Eisenhower’s administration and, along with it, the investment of U.S. forces, equipment 
and funds into the conflict. 
2. Phase II – Advisory Years, 1955–1964 
As the years following the 1954 Geneva Accords brought increased social and 
political disorder among the Vietnamese, the U.S. military steadily increased its presence 
and involvement in the conflict under the administrations of Eisenhower, Kennedy and 
Johnson.  The divisive and contentious environment that characterized Vietnam’s history 
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became increasingly unstable and complex following the Accord’s arbitrary partitioning 
of the north and south at the 17th parallel.73  Social unrest, political instability, and 
economic fragility characterized the essence of this environment.  Combined, these 
conditions formed the essence of the struggle that would continue through 1975, and 
encouraged the reemergence and organization of the Vietminh, evolving later into the 
National Liberation Front (NLF) and its armed wing, the Viet Cong (VC).  These 
organizations, supported by the North, began to pose a serious challenge to South 
Vietnamese authority and control.     
The U.S. military’s primary effort in this phase was to develop, advise and assist 
the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) as it opposed this growing threat.  To this 
end, the U.S. military expanded its deployment from a force size of just over 500 
personnel in 1960, to over 23,000 by 1964.74  Moreover, the relatively small Military 
Advisory and Assistance Group (MAAG) that headed U.S. advisory efforts at the outset 
of American involvement saw itself supplanted by the formation of the much larger 
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) in early 1962.  This larger organization 
assumed control of all U.S. forces in country, which included responsibility and oversight 
for all advisory efforts, as well as coordination and engagement with key South 
Vietnamese government and security force leaders and institutions.75  Despite this 
significantly increased level of involvement and influence, conditions in Vietnam 
continued to worsen socially, politically and militarily. 
The assassination of South Vietnam’s President Diem in 1963 triggered the start 
of nearly continuous political violence and social instability that would result in multiple 
coups through the rest of this phase.  Simultaneously, the Viet Cong increased its 
offensives through 1963 and 1964 producing several significant victories and higher 
casualties among the ARVN, as well as increasing U.S. losses in casualties and 
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equipment.76  Finally, a relatively minor (and heavily disputed) set of engagements 
between the U.S. Navy and North Vietnamese patrol boats in the Gulf of Tonkin during 
August of 1964 signaled a major decision point for the U.S. in determining its course in 
Vietnam.  Cumulatively, these deteriorating conditions shaped U.S. perceptions to 
compel a significant shift in focus during the next phase of its involvement in Vietnam. 
3. Phase III – America’s Full Commitment, 1965–1968 
This phase witnessed the U.S. military expand its organization to reach its greatest 
end strength throughout the duration of the war while simultaneously assuming primary 
responsibility for engaging the VC and North Vietnamese Army (NVA).  Beginning with 
a gradual introduction of ground combat forces initially intended to protect U.S. 
installations against the losses experienced in the previous phase, American escalation 
continued until it reached over 500,000 personnel in 1968.77   
With an increasingly larger force, and minimal specific strategic guidance from 
military and political leadership to guide operations, MACV focused primarily upon 
finding and destroying large units of VC and NVA.78  MACV’s focus predictably 
relegated development of ARVN to a secondary priority despite the clear need for 
improvements evidenced by its performance in the previous phases.  Likewise, securing 
and pacifying the population also remained a secondary priority based on the assumption 
that degradation of VC and NVA forces would necessarily enable and promote increased 
population security.79 
Although a number of major operations and innumerable smaller engagements 
occurred throughout the course of this phase with success at the tactical level, the U.S. 
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could achieve no decisive victory against VC or NVA forces at the operational or 
strategic levels.   Further, the U.S. military’s concerted effort toward offensive operations 
and the application of overwhelming firepower allowed ARVN’s capability to atrophy 
and contributed to the social disruption that plagued the population, thereby worsening 
the underlying conditions that initiated the conflict.80  The initiation of the Tet Offensive 
in January of 1968 starkly demonstrated the VC and NVA’s ability to mount major, 
coordinated offensive operations across South Vietnam for a sustained period despite the 
significant degree of U.S. effort and resources expended over the previous years.81  While 
the Tet Offensive’s conclusion in February yielded considerable VC and NVA casualties, 
the destruction among the major city centers increased the toll on an already weakened 
South Vietnamese population and government, and significantly eroded U.S. domestic 
support for continued involvement.82  These results provided the primary impetus for the 
United States to shift its effort in the final phase of its intervention. 
4. Phase IV – Vietnamization and American Withdrawal, 1969–1973 
The final phase of U.S. involvement in Vietnam witnessed the gradual withdrawal 
of its military forces and a renewed emphasis on developing ARVN capabilities, 
commonly referred to as ‘Vietnamization’, and the Accelerated Pacification Program to 
secure the population.83  These goals reflected U.S. desires to return primary 
responsibility for the war back to the South Vietnamese government and military.  With 
LTG William Westmoreland recalled to the United States, General Creighton Abrams 
assumed command and implemented these new priorities with a similar lack of strategic 
guidance from senior political and military leaders.84  Abrams supervised these efforts 
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while maintaining a considerable focus on offensive operations, albeit in modified form, 
despite the increasingly dramatic reduction of military forces throughout this phase.  U.S. 
domestic support continued to collapse while President Nixon insisted on a gradual U.S. 
force withdrawal to allow sufficient time for ARVN capabilities to increase, to prevent 
the catastrophic collapse of the government, and to maintaining pressure on the North for 
a negotiated a peace settlement.85  MACV’s effort to apply this pressure largely failed, as 
indicated by the massive conventional attacks launched by the North Vietnamese in 
1972.86  Although the South Vietnamese held out, U.S. involvement rapidly ended with a 
treaty signed in January of 1973.87  The majority of U.S. forces finally withdrew in 
March of 1973, thus concluding the U.S. military’s direct contribution to the political 
struggle over Vietnam’s future.88 
B. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
This case focuses its analysis between the years 1965 and 1968, beginning with 
the U.S. response to the Gulf of Tonkin incident in late1964 and concluding with its 
response to the communist Tet Offensive in early 1968.  As outlined in the preceding 
summary, America’s commitment and military involvement in Vietnam reached its 
greatest levels during this period, as expressed by the amount of resources invested into 
the conflict and the increasing degree of control it asserted over the effort.  These two 
dynamics permitted the development of an extraordinarily large U.S. military force 
package that assumed near total responsibility for the conflict waged against the 
communist forces.  Developments involving national imperative, the military 
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organization, and influential stakeholders shaped the context of this specific time interval 
and thus affected the military organization’s decisions and actions with respect to the 
casual chain of metrics development.   
The years leading up to 1965 generally reflect a high degree of national 
imperative with respect to U.S. concerns about the expansion of communist influence.  
Beginning with the significant events of the early 1950’s, public sentiment, and 
especially political sentiment, toward stemming and countering communist influence 
continued to grow.  Subsequent crises in the early 1960’s continued to foster this growing 
imperative beginning with Berlin in 1961, and the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962.  Despite 
this wider concern regarding communist expansion, much of the American public 
remained unaware of U.S. involvement in Vietnam between the 1950’s and early 
1960’s.89  However, the increasing U.S. losses between 1963 and 1964, as well as the 
shocking violence and unrest provoked by the Buddhist revolts and Diem assassination, 
shifted this heretofore broadly focused imperative toward the ongoing efforts in Vietnam.  
Finally, the Gulf of Tonkin incident galvanized U.S. political leaders’ demands for 
decisive action and increased public awareness and concern regarding the conflict.       
Additionally, MACV’s rapidly enlarged size and expanded responsibilities 
together indicated an increasing degree of U.S. political concern over Vietnam.  This 
concern amplified political pressure exerted on the organization and encouraged 
increasingly bureaucratic behavior to manage its operations.  While subordinate to U.S. 
Pacific Command, senior military and political leaders, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
and senior Department of State officials among others, communicated directly with 
MACV, outside the bounds of its normal command and control relationships.90  While 
this certainly increased the organization’s political influence, the unusually direct 
interface with the highest levels of leadership also generated significant pressure for 
reports of progress and success over the coming years.   
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Before MACV’s significant growth, it initially restricted itself to an 
administrative role in assigning and supporting its advisors within the South Vietnamese 
military structure.  Rather than coordinating and directing their individual efforts, it relied 
primarily on the judgment of its advisors to decide how to execute their mission.91 Thus, 
the U.S. advisory effort operated in a significantly decentralized manner in the earlier 
phases of its involvement.92  General Westmoreland initially embraced this 
organizational model when he took over MACV later in 1964.93  This decentralized 
manner of coordination would change dramatically, however, as the organization grew 
and American military advisors incrementally increased their integration within South 
Vietnamese forces from higher headquarters down into tactical units.94  This enhanced 
integration accordingly increased their access and influence as well as their exposure to 
combat.95  Predictably, U.S. headquarters and support infrastructure continued to expand 
their size and reach to accommodate the dramatically increasing number of advisors and 
support units deployed to the conflict between 1960 and 1965.96  Combined, these 
developments served to increase the degree of influence and control wielded by the U.S. 
military thereby increasing its bureaucratic characteristics and mechanisms considered 
necessary to coordinate and supervise this larger force.  In this way, MACV began to 
exert more centralized control by standardizing and formalizing its various advisement 
efforts that previously were left to the individual judgments of its advisors.  
Finally, two influential figures wielded extraordinary influence in shaping the 
force package and its behaviors between 1965 and 1968.   Secretary of Defense Robert 
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McNamara, appointed in 1961 by President Kennedy, proved to be an especially 
important figure both in terms of influencing the force package developed, and also in 
how it assessed its progress.  Together, McNamara’s education, military service, and 
business experience profoundly shaped his preference for a rigorous, systems analysis 
and operations research approach to assessing progress.97  In this way, he would reinforce 
the importance of obtaining quantitative assessments from the military force package. 
Appointed as MACV’s commander in 1964, General William Westmoreland also 
exerted enormous influence on the military organization in Vietnam between 1965 and 
1968.  Westmoreland’s successful rise through important command and staff positions 
within the conventional Army, including combat commands in WWII and Korea, 
inevitably reinforced strong confidence in the Army’s bureaucratic processes, systems 
and adherence to its doctrinal methods of prosecuting war.98  With this background and 
perspective, Westmoreland would influence the development of the military 
organization’s behaviors and characteristics in Vietnam.  Combined, these events and 
influences established conditions that greatly affected the metrics development causal 
chain between 1965 and 1968.  The following sections will describe how national 
imperative and MACV’s organizational behavior influenced its metric development and 
balance this against an assessment of their suitability to the unique context of the conflict.  
C. NATIONAL IMPERATIVE 
The degree of national imperative driving U.S. military involvement in Vietnam 
beginning in 1965 was high and therefore encouraged an increasingly larger investment 
of resources into the conflict, as described by the metrics development causal chain in 
Chapter II.  First, senior political and military leaderships’ unusually direct access to 
MACV headquarters, circumventing its official chain of command, greatly increased 
                                                 
97  Tim Weiner, “Robert S. McNamara, Architect of a Futile War, Dies at 93,” New York Times, July 
6, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/07/us/07mcnamara.html?pagewanted=all (accessed October 29, 
2011). 
98  Craig R. Whitney and Eric Pace, “William C. Westmoreland Is Dead at 91; General Led U.S. 
Troops in Vietnam,” New York Times, July 19, 2005 , 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/19/international/asia/19westmoreland.html?pagewanted=all (accessed 
October 29, 2011). 
 63 
pressure for reports of progress and success throughout the period.  Second, the 
significant political action taken in the spring and summer of 1964 reflected this high 
degree of national imperative and directly facilitated the increased investment of 
resources and shift in strategy in 1965.   Third, the public response to the events that 
precipitated this political action further reflected the high degree of imperative that 
initiated this phase of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. 
The 1964 National Security Action Memo (NSAM) 288 and Gulf of Tonkin 
Resolution stand out as two important political actions that significantly shaped U.S. 
involvement in Vietnam in 1965 and beyond.99  These two measures indicate the larger 
political imperative of this period.  Within NSAM 288, President Johnson approved 
recommendations for increased U.S. military action in Vietnam as proposed by Secretary 
McNamara in his report dated March 16, 1964.100  This report, and its recommended 
actions, represented a significant escalation of U.S. involvement and a departure from the 
generally more constrained advisory years in the previous two phases.101  This policy 
approval by President Johnson reflects the increasing U.S. political drive to take decisive 
action following the significant social, political, and military deterioration in South 
Vietnam between 1963 and 1964.   
Public Law 88–408, more popularly known as the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, 
represents a significantly higher degree of imperative following controversial 
engagements between North Vietnamese patrol craft and U.S. Navy destroyers.  Passed 
by Congress in August 1964, the wording of this landmark legislation was sufficiently 
broad as to permit direct U.S. military intervention against communist force in Vietnam 
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well beyond the scope of its previously constrained advisory role.102  While the 
permission for the use of force is significant in itself, the manner in which Congress 
passed this legislation is far more indicative of the political demand for action.  For the 
otherwise highly contentious issue of applying direct military force, the House of 
Representatives achieved unanimous approval in approximately 40 minutes, while the 
Senate approved the measure nearly unanimously (48–2) in less than ten hours.103   
Moreover, public support for this increased level of involvement appeared to 
match this political expression of support with Johnson’s approval ratings in the Harris 
Lewis polls increased from a low 42 percent up to 72 after this series of events.104  
Likewise, American public support for involvement in Vietnam grew to reach its highest 
levels in 1965.105 While public support for involvement in Vietnam would begin to 
dissipate through 1966 and 1967, their support for an escalation of forces simultaneously 
grew and peaked by late 1967.106  While this may initially appear counterintuitive, this 
suggests a strong public desire for decisive action in Vietnam.      
With these indicators of political and public support for decisive action in 
Vietnam, the degree of national imperative toward Vietnam clearly appears high.  This 
high degree of national imperative increased the demands for reporting from senior 
military and political leaders, facilitated by an abnormally close relationship between the 
command and Washington.  Simultaneously, it increased the amount of resources 
invested into the U.S. military organization in Vietnam, thus expanding its size and level 
of involvement in the conflict. 
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D. THE U.S. MILITARY ORGANIZATION IN VIETNAM 
The U.S. military force package engaged in Vietnam between 1965 and 1968 
exhibited a high degree of machine bureaucratic characteristics despite the extreme 
instability and complexity evident in its environment.  The organization predictably relied 
heavily on formalizing and standardizing the actions and behaviors of its subordinate 
units in an effort to achieve greater coordination and process efficiency in its operations.  
Several important indicators amply demonstrate the organization’s close reflection of the 
machine bureaucratic form. 
Increasing an organization’s size will naturally lead it to assume greater degrees 
of bureaucratic characteristics in order to achieve greater efficiency and control its 
expanded assets.107 MACV’s increased size forced it to allot a greater degree of time and 
resources to the administration of those personnel, units, and assets while simultaneously 
attending to the demands of its advisory, or later, combat missions.  Between 1965 and 
1968, the U.S. military organization under the command of MACV exploded from 
approximately 23,000 personnel to nearly 540,000; a staggering increase almost 24 times 
greater than its original size only four years earlier.108  In 1965 alone, the organization’s 
overall end strength increased nearly 800%, which included the addition of 
approximately four full combat divisions comprised of Army and Marine elements and 
their associated support units.109 MACV headquarters itself nearly doubled in size in this 
same year reaching an equivalent strength of nearly 2 battalions, or 2,000 personnel, as it 
entered 1966.110  These first-year figures illustrate a trend that would continue over the 
next two years, and highlight classic indicators of bureaucratic characteristics described 
in Chapter 2: enlarged headquarters elements and increasing numbers of subordinate 
echelons.  
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Additionally, MACV’s centralized control over subordinate elements and strict 
adherence to doctrinally prescribed offensive operations, at the expense of other 
supporting efforts, represents a clear manifestation of the formalization and 
standardization that marked its bureaucratic characteristics.  Specifically, the military 
force package devoted itself to directing large units to find, fix, and destroy the enemy’s 
main force units throughout this period.111  Beginning with the 1st Cavalry Division’s 
engagement in the Ia Drang Valley in 1965, MACV continued with these operations 
throughout the duration of the period.112  The organization chose this course deliberately 
despite years of evidence indicating that South Vietnam’s problems warranted greater 
time and resource investment in security force development as well as population security 
and development.  Nonetheless, MACV’s resource allocation reveals its clear 
prioritization of offensive operations at the expense of other, arguably more vital 
missions including the pacification of the local population.  For example, in 1968 MACV 
spent the equivalent of $14 billion dollars to conduct its offensive operations while 
allocating only $850 million for programs meant to support pacification and 
reconstruction efforts.113  The organization’s nearly mechanical pursuit of finding, fixing 
and destroying main force enemy units at the expense of other potentially more useful 
endeavors reflects the highly bureaucratic characteristics of the organization. Assessing 
the conflict’s progress largely upon the results of these offensive operations reflects an 
inward orientation toward its activities, consistent with the machine bureaucracy, instead 
of focusing outward on the clear social, political and economic needs of the 
environment.114  
Furthermore, MACV demonstrated high formalization and standardization in its 
administrative management of the war as well.  To satisfy internally derived efficiency 
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goals, MACV supported personnel administration policies that rotated individuals into 
Vietnam rather than units who had trained and prepared together.115  Likewise, 
individuals rotated in and out of command positions of units already stationed in country 
and, at times, limited these tours to 6 months in order to standardize the experience level 
of the officer corps.116  Rather than working toward building experience among members 
of cohesive units and thereby develop greater innovation, adaptation, and understanding 
of their environment, the military organization sought to standardize a base level of 
experience throughout the force.     
While the preceding section illustrates only a selection of MACV’s machine 
bureaucratic characteristics, the dominance of its organizational expression is clear.  As 
discussed in Chapter II, this high degree of bureaucratic behavior increased MACV’s 
preference for assessment metrics characterizing agent activity and depicted in 
quantitative form.  These metrics proved to be more accessible in terms of their collection 
and interpretation, at the expense of providing greater descriptive depth. 
E. THE NATURE OF METRICS 
The U.S. military force package engaged in Vietnam between 1965 and 1968 
demonstrated a dominant preference for assessing its progress in quantitative terms with a 
focus on measurements of agent activity.  As such, the MACV developed and reinforced 
a strong inward orientation in attempting to judge its success rather than an outward 
orientation that sought greater understanding of the environment.  Those metrics that did 
attempt to assess the environment unfortunately did not contain the descriptive depth 
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the scrutiny on MACV’s assessments used during this period focus on its evaluations of 
combat operations with the “body count” figuring prominently as an “output” indicator of 
agent activity.117   
Common assessment criteria in this realm included the number of operations 
conducted, enemy equipment destroyed or captured, friendly and enemy casualties, and 
ammunition expended.  These criteria demonstrate a strong inward orientation on activity 
in terms of inputs and outputs, especially in quantitative terms.  While these certainly 
demonstrate MACV’s strong preference for quantitative measurements of agent activity, 
other reports used throughout the period provide a more interesting illustration of its 
assessment preferences.  These also serve to underscore the organization’s bureaucratic 
behaviors and procedures as described in the previous section.    
It is significant to note that during its earlier advisory phases, MACV’s 
assessment methods and procedures differed significantly from those used between 1965 
and 1968.  In the years preceding 1964, advisor assessments of their South Vietnamese 
partners occurred informally, often during ‘face to face meetings’ with supervisors and 
without much standardization. 118  While clearly constrained by the limited administrative 
capacity of the organization’s smaller staffing at that time, this approach suggests that the 
smaller organization demonstrated a high level of comfort with the qualitative 
assessments of its advisors based on their descriptions, observations and judgments.  This 
also suggests less bureaucratic reliance on formatted reports delivered within a strict 
timeline.   
However, the decision to increase the role and size of the military organization in 
Vietnam beginning in 1965 drastically changed the method and means through which the 
organization assessed its progress.  “As the war grew in size and complexity, so did the 
paper work demands on individual advisors, and some were preparing as many as forty 
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reports every month.”119  The Senior Adviser Monthly Evaluation Report (SAME) 
represents one example of these assessments focused on the South Vietnamese 
military.120  This assessment reduced the otherwise complex task of evaluating the South 
Vietnamese military into quantitative terms that evaluated their activities.  For example, a 
unit’s ability to accomplish a given task, whether combat or administrative, received an 
evaluation of “satisfactory,” “marginal,” or “unsatisfactory.”  In essence, this assessment 
scheme merely ranked each task considered on an ordinal scale to facilitate statistical 
comparison with other South Vietnamese units.121  While advisors had the opportunity to 
provide a qualitatively based “narrative description” to provide greater context to these 
essentially numerical reports, they were mostly disregarded by senior officers except to 
clarify instances where discrepancies emerged in conducting statistical comparison.122  
Westmoreland’s threats to restrict or withdraw military assistance from South 
Vietnamese units deemed “unproductive” highlights the extreme value placed on 
quantitative evaluations of activity.123    
MACV updated its evaluation scheme for the South Vietnamese military in 1968 
with the development of the quarterly System for Evaluating the Effectiveness of 
Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (SEER).124  However, this “new” assessment system 
remained focused on providing quantitative assessments of agent activity.  While its 
evaluation categories expanded to include 157 topics, its multiple-choice format 
continued to rank South Vietnamese activity on a very basic, if enlarged ordinal scale.125  
                                                 
119  Jeffrey J. Clarke, Advice and Support: The Final Years, 1965–1973 (Washington D.C.: Center of 
Military History, United States Army, 1988), 60. 
120  Jeffrey J. Clarke, Advice and Support: The Final Years, 1965–1973 (Washington D.C.: Center of 
Military History, United States Army, 1988), 60. 
121  Jeffrey J. Clarke, Advice and Support: The Final Years, 1965–1973 (Washington D.C.: Center of 
Military History, United States Army, 1988), 241–242. 
122  Jeffrey J. Clarke, Advice and Support: The Final Years, 1965–1973 (Washington D.C.: Center of 
Military History, United States Army, 1988), 242. 
123  Jeffrey J. Clarke, Advice and Support: The Final Years, 1965–1973 (Washington D.C.: Center of 
Military History, United States Army, 1988), 244. 
124  Jeffrey J. Clarke, Advice and Support: The Final Years, 1965–1973 (Washington D.C.: Center of 
Military History, United States Army, 1988), 324. 
125  Jeffrey J. Clarke, Advice and Support: The Final Years, 1965–1973 (Washington D.C.: Center of 
Military History, United States Army, 1988), 325. 
 70 
This included otherwise complex and malleable concepts like leadership, relationships, 
and morale.  In addition to the time-intensive, formalized and standardized evaluation 
format of the SEER, advisors continued to fill out additional statistical reports on a 
monthly basis that further characterized their partner force’s activities in simple, 
quantitative terms.126       
MACV’s efforts to assess its pacification efforts followed a similar pattern as 
described with the SAME and SEER reporting.  Robert Komer’s Hamlet Evaluation 
System (HES), implemented in 1967 through the newly established Civil Operations and 
Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) directorate, represents one significant 
example of this.127  Despite the complexity of assessing and understanding the 
population, this monthly, computerized report strove to reduce pacification evaluations in 
South Vietnam’s 44 provinces and 13,000 hamlets into quantitative terms for ease of 
analysis, interpretation and comparison.128  Again, these reports primarily assessed a 
hamlet’s activities and assigned them an ordinal score (‘A’ through ‘E’) in order to 
produce a final, overall ordinal ranking.129  This format allowed little opportunity for 
advisors to contribute qualitative, descriptive assessments and observations, while 
simultaneously reducing complex relationships and behavior into over-simplified terms.  
In this way, as in other similar reporting formats, data collection itself became more 
important than the analysis and understanding it intended to facilitate.130 
The preceding examples provide insight into MACV’s dominant metric 
preferences between 1965 and 1968.  While the early advisory phases witnessed much 
greater tolerance for descriptive, qualitative assessments delivered less formally, the 
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increased size and scope of responsibilities correlate with a shift toward a heavily 
formalized and standardized format.  More importantly, this format focused primarily on 
assessing activities, events and relationships in quantitative terms, often with an inward 
orientation at the organization itself.  As argued in Chapter II, these characteristics, while 
certainly accessible, lack a great deal of descriptive depth when attempting to interpret 
the complexity and instability of the IW environment in South Vietnam. 
F. APPROPRIATE/INAPPROPRIATE METRICS IN VIETNAM 
MACV’s dominant preference for measuring its progress through agent activity 
and quantification between 1965 and 1968 appears to be an inappropriate application of 
metrics in IW.  These characteristics, and especially its strong inward orientation in 
assessing combat operations, prevented an outward orientation that would have greatly 
enhanced its ability to interpret and understand the IW environment.  The insufficiency of 
these metrics emerged in all of MACV’s efforts, to include its combat operations, 
advising the South Vietnamese, and pacification efforts. 
MACV’s efforts to assess the success of its combat operations primarily through 
quantification and analysis of agent activity prevented it from understanding the larger 
context of the political struggle.  Its prioritization of engaging and destroying enemy 
forces (VC or NVA) implicitly assumes that the appearance and sustainment of these 
forces is, in itself, the central problem and not merely a symptom of the problem; in this 
case, the product of an extremely fractured and disenfranchised society.  To this end, 
MACV sought to understand its progress in terms of the number of operations conducted, 
casualties inflicted, equipment damaged or destroyed, and other similar points of agent 
activity.  These kinds of measures proved minimally useful since MACV experienced 
consistent difficulty in obtaining accurate and reliable information about the enemy 
forces and political structure to compare against these figures.131  In particular, MACV 
had minimal credible information detailing how large the communist forces were, or how 
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quickly they could regenerate themselves. Later analysis suggested that the NVA could 
field nearly 200,000 replacements annually to offset the casualties it sustained.132  
MACV estimates of the casualties inflicted, even those considered over-inflated, never 
came close to 200,000.133  Thus, basing its reporting on quantitative agent activity was, in 
these instances, mostly misleading or useless.  
Similarly, the metrics used by MACV to evaluate the South Vietnamese military 
proved misleading and ultimately inappropriate.  In particular, the characterization of unit 
activity and performance on a simple ordinal scale facilitated a wide array of reliability 
issues with South Vietnamese units receiving inconsistent and seemingly counterintuitive 
ratings across multiple rating periods.134  The South Vietnamese performance during the 
Tet Offensive in 1968 highlighted the uneven quality of their various forces, which the 
preceding evaluations did not seem to predict with any degree of precision.135  Aside 
from the inconsistencies evident in the reporting and observed performance in Tet, the 
rigidly applied and simplified metrics failed to account for the nuance of each unit’s 
unique contextual environment and conditions, thus degrading the metric’s overall 
descriptive depth.136  In this way, the MACV’s assessments of the South Vietnamese 
military provided little that could help shape future advisor efforts to address 
shortcomings and enhance the capabilities of those units in need.     
Finally, MACV’s evaluation of its pacification efforts generally failed to 
accurately assess the true sentiment of the Vietnamese occupying the countryside, and 
thus missed arguably one of the most crucial elements of the larger conflict.  As with the 
South Vietnamese military, MACV’s measurement criteria and assessment format 
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produced a relatively low degree of descriptive depth about the population and regular, 
inconsistent reporting which combined to confound any substantive conclusions.  Thus, 
“…as MACV reported slow but steady gains in their pacification programs throughout 
1967, the bulk of the Vietnamese in the countryside remained uncommitted to the Saigon 
government.”137  Additionally, a CBS News survey from the same period indicated that 
48% of South Vietnamese respondents reported that their lives were worse than the 
previous year.138  Therefore, while MACV and South Vietnamese efforts toward 
pacification proved to be insufficient or even failing, their metrics provided no indication 
of this, or worse, were ignored.  In either case, they failed to foment a shift in effort 
toward addressing the grievances of the population and providing for their basic needs, 
which undoubtedly contributed significantly to the perpetuation of the conflict. 
G. CONCLUSION 
This survey of MACV’s involvement in Vietnam between 1965 and 1968 
provides significant observations and conclusions regarding the development and use of 
metrics in IW.  This period observed a markedly high national imperative founded in the 
significant confrontations with Soviet and Chinese communist powers during the 
preceding years, but cresting with direct engagements against Vietnamese communist 
forces and the increased U.S. losses that resulted.  Perceptions that Vietnam and 
Southeast Asia could fall into the communist sphere perpetuated concerns of a significant 
strategic loss that would provoke equally significant consequences in domestic and 
international politics.  To prevent this outcome, the Johnson administration decided to 
increase its investment of resources into Vietnam dramatically, and embrace a more 
direct role in the conflict.  As described in Chapter II, the high national imperative and 
the increased resources invested into the conflict would exert an adverse influence on the 
military force’s development and application of metrics.  Specifically, the military and 
political leadership’s demands for decisive action and reports of progress leveraged 
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pressure on the military organization to use the most accessible metrics, quantitative 
measures of agent activity, which thereby reinforced a narrow, inward organizational 
orientation in assessing the conflict.  Simultaneously, the rapidly increased size of the 
military organization, naturally inclined to machine bureaucratic behavior, encouraged 
greater emphasis on standardizing and formalizing the efforts of its subordinate elements 
to achieve better coordination and control.  These systems and procedures further 
reinforced its natural inward orientation toward achieving the perception of ‘production’ 
and process efficiency at the expense of orienting its assessments outward toward the 
environment. 
MACV’s inward orientation and reliance upon metrics with minimal descriptive 
depth obstructed a meaningful understanding of Vietnam’s IW environment, and thus 
prevented the organization from tailoring efforts to address the roots of the conflict.  
These involved deep fissures between the social, cultural, political, and religious 
identities of the nation aggravated by earlier periods of French colonization and Japanese 
occupation.139  The wrecked economy and political vacuum following France’s departure 
only worsened these conditions and the increased infighting among these groups. 140  
However, by focusing its primary efforts against the VC and NVA military forces, 
MACV focused mechanistically on mere symptoms of these problems and not their base 
causes.  MACV’s primary reliance on inward-oriented metrics and quantifiable data that 
provided minimal descriptive depth did little to inform its leadership, or the senior 
national military and political leadership, of a needed shift in emphasis and effort.           
Ultimately, MACV proved itself unable to overcome the significant political 
pressures generated by the high national imperative, and MACV failed to recognize the 
consequences of its bureaucratic characteristics and behavior.  These errors thereby 
inhibited MACV’s ability to adapt and innovate its actions, and specifically its metrics, to 
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address and understand the deep complexity and instability of its IW environment.  While 
the subsequent phase of its involvement in Vietnam included some reprioritization of 
effort in name; in practice, MACV remained fundamentally committed to the same 
metric forms and therefore, maintained a similar focus of effort in its operations until its 
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V. OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 2007 
This final case study will focus on the period of Operation Iraqi Freedom, 
centered on the year 2007, commonly referred to as “the surge.”  During this time period 
the United States increased the forces committed to Iraq and changed strategy to focus on 
population security.  We selected this case because the national imperative of the conflict 
was at a high point with the rising violence in Iraq increasing political pressures and 
popular discontent for the conflict.  Additionally, the surge of forces provides clear 
evidence of a high national imperative resulting in the selection of a larger military force 
package, which would imply an increase in machine bureaucratic tendencies that 
accompany larger military units.  However, unique to this case was the ability of the U.S. 
military to succeed in these conditions.  Starting with the surge and change of strategy in 
2007, the U.S. military in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM was able to overcome the 
challenges of a high national imperative and machine bureaucratic tendencies to 
effectively utilize metrics to gauge progress and direct efforts toward success.    
A. HISTORICAL NARRATIVE 
In March 2003, the United States launched Operation Iraqi Freedom, an invasion 
to topple Saddam Hussein’s regime.  In this conventional warfare-type invasion, America 
displayed military dominance and Iraq quickly fell.  Soon the world was greeted with 
images such as President Bush declaring mission accomplished, pictures of Saddam’s 
dead sons, and the images of Saddam Hussein being pulled from his hiding spot.  
However, these positive images overshadowed the lack of a post invasion plan.  Soon, the 
lack of governmental control led to instability and increased violence.  As a complex 
insurgency began to grow from both Sunni and Shia elements, U.S. officials, like 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, rejected the possibility of this threat, and simply 
attributed the violence to remnants of the Ba’ath regime that were being dealt with by 
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coalition forces.141  Reluctantly, in 2004 and 2005, the United States finally began to 
formulate a national strategy for IW in Iraq and associated political objectives.  The 
strategy focused on increasing the size and effectiveness of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in 
order to turn over responsibility to them as quickly as possible.142  Additionally, both 
U.S. civilian and military leaders believed that the presence of U.S. troops provoked 
hostility among the Iraqi people, “and thus sought to minimize the U.S. role, keeping 
American troops off the streets as much as possible and limiting their contact with the 
population.143  Thus, in the initial years of Operation Iraqi Freedom, military and civilian 
leaders focused on metrics indicating the ability to transition to Iraqi political control and 
the number of ISF produced.  This quickly proved problematic as analysts collected data 
while blind to the entire layers of the conflict; and as a result, even as Iraq met political 
milestones and increased numbers of ISF took responsibility for security, conditions in 
Iraq continued to deteriorate.144  Consequently, in 2006, the failure of this strategy 
became evident. 
On February 22, 2006, Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) bombed the al-Askari Shrine (the 
Golden Mosque) in Samarra, which marked a downward turning point in the war.  This 
act enraged the Shias in Iraq and led to rampant sectarian violence and mass killing 
between Shias and Sunnis.  However, the U.S. military failed to properly interpret this 
event.  A Department of Defense report published in May 2006 cited the bombing only to 
say that Iraq’s new leaders were standing united against further violence and seek to 
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continue with the political process.145  Up until this point, no one was accounting for 
levels of sectarian violence as indicators of successful strategy, and thus the military was 
not focused on stopping the violence.  As a result of the increased sectarian violence, 
civilian casualties escalated, and Iraqi governmental and military organizations became 
increasingly sectarian and unreliable.  The rise of violence also increased American 
popular discontent for the war and political pressure for ending the conflict and 
withdrawing the troops.   
Consequently, the November 2006 U.S. elections led to the Democrats winning 
control of both houses of Congress, which signaled the need for a new strategy in Iraq.  
Under pressures from the Democratic Congress, President Bush launched a sweeping 
formal review of Iraq policy, and while inflexible on strategic objectives, Bush wanted 
change on “tactics, operational methods, force levels, and eventually, personnel.”146  
Additionally, the resignation of Secretary Rumsfeld removed a major obstacle toward 
change, as he dominated decision making and continuously advocated a more rapid 
transition to the ISF, which was evidently failing.147  Then, with the advice of the 
National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and numerous outside 
counterinsurgency experts and policy analysts, the Bush administration conducted the 
important strategic shift of 2007, known as “the surge.”148 
B. HISTORICAL CONTEXT   
In developing the new strategy, the United States realized that securing the 
population had to be the focus.  As Jason Campbell and Michael O’Hanlon from the 
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Brookings Institute described, “overall civilian fatality rates from war-related violence 
must go down in Iraq if there this to be any hope of a better future.”149  This change in 
strategy did not come without risks though, politically or physically.  In December of 
2006, “the bipartisan Iraq Study Group’s assessment argued that the situation was 
‘deteriorating’ and that ‘the ability of the United States to shape outcomes is 
diminishing.’”150  Thus, President Bush became more amenable to high risk options in 
order to save victory because “in strategy, negative trends often increase the risk 
tolerance of decision makers.”151  Subsequently, a report by an American Enterprise 
Institute (AEI) study group led by retired General John Keane and Frederick Kagan, 
advocated a major troop increase and a shift in strategy to population security, which was 
more in line with U.S. COIN doctrine and would control the sectarian violence in 
Baghdad.152  However, increasing troops was politically risky as Congress was actively 
lobbying for the removal of troops.  Ultimately, in President Bush’s January 2007 State 
of the Union address, he “proposed a ‘surge’ of 21,500 new troops in a plan called ‘The 
New Way Forward in Iraq.’”153  The riskiness of the new strategy clearly indicated a high 
national imperative for the conflict, because if this new strategy did not prove successful 
then Iraq would be lost.  Additionally, this new strategy needed to quickly provide 
indicators of progress in order to appease political pressures and growing popular 
displeasure for the conflict. 
The new strategy also brought in new leadership in the form of General David 
Petraeus as the new Multi-National Forces-Iraq commander.   Based on our hypotheses in 
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Chapter II, with the increased numbers of troops involved in the surge, Petraeus had to 
avoid the machine bureaucratic tendencies inherent with large military organizations in 
order to effectively interpret the IW environment in Iraq.  Petraeus had written his Ph.D. 
about the success of COIN decentralization to district intelligence centers in Vietnam, 
and thus brought this concept to Iraq by installing Joint Security Stations (JSS) in every 
district to collect actionable intelligence and launch reaction forces.154 Additionally, 
Petraeus was frustrated with Iraq’s inability to move forward politically and the absence 
of “top-down” leadership; therefore, Petraeus wanted to focus on a “bottom-up” model 
for stability, believing that local population security would drive all other elements 
toward stability. 155 This began with moving soldiers off the large bases and into 
neighborhoods, especially along the fault lines where the Sunnis were being driven or 
where al Qaeda was in control.156  Petraeus also issued COIN guidance that stressed the 
necessity to “Understand the Neighborhood,” in order to fully understand the human 
terrain and the nuances of the local environment.157  Additionally, population security 
became the primary mission by “maintaining a persistent, ‘24/7’ forward presence among 
the population through Joint Security Stations, Coalition outposts, and active patrolling – 
day and night.”158  Thus, during the surge, every few weeks another JSS or Coalition 
outpost (COP) was constructed, and within a short time the residents and soldiers got to 
know each other, information tips began coming in, insurgents started moving out, and 
violence began to decline.159  Furthermore, the focus on decentralization, co-location of 
forces with the population, and population security facilitated relationships with tribal 
sheikhs that led to Coalition Forces hiring and arming Sunni militias to further help 
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secure the population against sectarian violence and AQI threats.  Overall, the new 
strategy enabled the U.S. military in Iraq to better understand the environment, protect 
the population, and establish stability from the bottom up to facilitate success in Iraq.  
Next, this case study will explore how General Petraeus and the U.S. military in Iraq was 
able to overcome the pressures associated with a high national imperative and 
organizational tendencies to effectively measure progress, evaluate operations, and 
achieve success during the surge. 
C. NATIONAL IMPERATIVE 
The high national imperative of the Iraq conflict in 2007 resulted in more troops 
being allocated to the conflict, and created political and public demands for indicators of 
progress.  General Petraeus realized that he did not want to make the mistake of his 
predecessors by citing progress through activity based indicators that proved short lived 
and not representative of actual conditions.160  However, Petraeus also understood that 
with the high national imperative, politicians and the public would need easily accessible 
metrics that quantitatively and succinctly portrayed signs of progress.  As a result, 
Petraeus had members of his staff “systematically array all quantitative measures and 
double check them for accuracy.  Monthly, they were released to the public.”161  This 
accurate, quantitative data was also related to trends over time to indicate valid progress.  
Members of Congress accused Petraeus of “cherry-picking” data that only highlighted the 
positives, a common fallacy with quantitative measures, but Petraeus promptly responded 
in his September 2007 testimony that “with respect to the facts that I have laid out today, 
I very much stand by those.  If I did not think that it was an endeavor in which we could 
succeed, I would not have testified as I did.”162  Thus, Petraeus and the military 
organization in Iraq were able to overcome the national demands for results by 
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systematically providing the politicians and the public with thorough and accurate 
metrics reflecting the current situation in Iraq. 
Additionally, a high national imperative pressures the military organization to 
focus internally on readily accessible metrics in order to quickly satisfy policymaker 
demands for progress, instead of focusing outward on environmental outcomes, as is 
required in IW.  However, Petraeus avoided these pressures in order to allow the strategy 
to succeed.  Instead of requiring instant feedback from his subordinate units, Petraeus 
granted his subordinate units the latitude and time to understand the environment and 
focus efforts toward influencing outcomes.  The decentralized nature of the new strategy 
required time in order to be successful.  For instance, Congress was expecting a June or 
July assessment of whether the new strategy in Iraq was working.  However, Petraeus 
postponed the hearings until September, realizing that it would take a while for the 
effects of the strategy to be evaluated.163  Thus, Petraeus was able to overcome the 
influences of a high national imperative by effectively managing the external demands 
for indicators of progress with regular quantitative reports of the situation in Iraq, while 
in conjunction allowing time for the new strategy to work and time for his subordinate 
units to interpret the environment and focus on outcomes.   
D. THE U.S. MILITARY ORGANIZATION IN OPERATION IRAQI 
FREEDOM 
As discussed in Chapter II, when the military organization increases in size, the 
organization will develop more machine bureaucratic tendencies in order to effectively 
manage the increased numbers.  Therefore, the surge of 21,500 additional troops should 
have led to increased bureaucracy and more reliance on the principles of standardization 
and formalization to manage resources and gauge performance.   However, the U.S. 
military organization in Iraq, and the new strategy, avoided these dangers by relying on 
experience, professionalism, and the ability to mutually adjust across the battlefield. 
Specifically, one of the most important enablers of the new strategy was the improvement 
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of U.S. forces from more experience and training, to better tactics, techniques, and 
procedures (TTPs); and thus, not only more troops, but better troops.164  These better 
troops allowed the military leaders to decentralize operations down to the JSS’s and 
COPs, thus facilitating increased population security. 
Additionally, the increased capability of U.S. forces allowed military leaders to 
push down responsibility to the lower levels at the outstations, which demonstrated the 
military’s departure away from conventional reliance on standardization and 
formalization toward increased reliance on mutual adjustment, expertise, and innovation 
necessary for IW.   In Petraeus’s September 2007 report to Congress, he spoke to the 
increased capability of U.S. forces by stating that “we have employed counterinsurgency 
practices that underscore the importance of units living among the people they are 
securing, and accordingly, our forces have established dozens of joint security stations 
and patrol bases manned by Coalition and Iraqi forces in Baghdad and other areas across 
Iraq.”165 This decentralization of responsibility fostered organizational innovation as 
individual units were able to focus on creating new solutions to problems specific to their 
neighborhood and solvable only through detailed understanding of the environment.  
Additionally, the decentralization of responsibility and increased professionalism 
enhanced mutual adjustment, as adjacent units routinely cross-coordinated to react to 
environmental changes and enhance operations.   Thus, the U.S. military organization 
during the surge was able to avoid the bureaucratic pressures caused by the increased 
force package.  Instead, the increased professionalism of the forces and the new 
strategy’s focus on decentralization, innovation, and mutual adjustment facilitated 
environmental understanding and successful operations. 
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E. THE NATURE OF METRICS 
With the new strategy of the surge in motion, the role of metrics was increasingly 
important to evaluate the success of operations and the strategy itself.  As Karen Guttieri 
describes, “analysis of data collected can shape strategy to great advantage, but a false 
reading of the environment is potentially dangerous.”166  Thus, with the high national 
imperative of the conflict and the increased commitment of resources, metrics became 
crucial.  Petraeus alluded to their importance by describing that “we do not, however, just 
rely on gut feel or personal observations; we also conduct considerable data collection 
and analysis to gauge progress and determine trends.”167  More importantly, the data 
collected was focused on depicting the environment, or outcomes, and not on the 
activities of the organization itself.  This was accomplished by collecting data from both 
coalition and Iraqi operation centers, using methods greatly enhanced by the presence of 
coalition forces living among the Iraqi people.168  Thus, the United States’ strategy of 
securing the population by living amongst them in JSS’s and COP’s enabled the military 
to effectively acquire and focus on outcome based metrics to interpret the environment. 
Also, the surge strategy relied on both quantitative and qualitative measurements 
of outcomes to indicate progress and success.  Quantitative measurements were still a 
necessity in order to satisfy the demands of external stakeholders and the high national 
imperative.  However, what was unique to the new strategy was the increased ability to 
gain qualitative measures of outcomes.  The JSS’s and COP’s enabled the collection of 
qualitative measurements that facilitated and evaluated crucial local relationships and 
enabled detailed understanding of the local environment.  Therefore, while satisfying  
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external stakeholders with quantitative measures of outcomes, the military also focused 
on qualitative measures of outcomes to enhance internal understanding of the complex 
conflict. 
F. APPROPRIATE/INAPPROPRIATE METRICS IN OPERATION IRAQI 
FEEDOM 
Lastly, it is important to determine if the metrics utilized by the military in Iraq 
were appropriate for that period of the conflict.  With quantitative metrics, problems can 
arise with the selectiveness of the data and its inadequacies in capturing the multiple 
layers of the conflict.  For instance, naysayers of Petraeus’s reports to Congress state that 
he used the trends in ethno-sectarian violence beginning in May 2006 to show progress, 
because the high level of attacks in 2006 serve as a baseline, and anything lower provides 
a “rosier picture of progress.”169  However, with the new strategy in 2007, military 
leaders realized that “the key indicator of progress in security was Iraqi civilian 
casualties, not those inflicted on the American or Iraqi militaries.”170  With the current 
levels of high ethno-sectarian violence, Petraeus believed that a decrease in civilian 
casualties would indicate increased stability; whereas, American or Iraqi casualties were 
difficult to interpret because as the military increased their operations in previously 
uncontested areas, casualties were bound to increase as well.  Furthermore, Petraeus’s 
quantitative metrics had qualitative aspects to increase environmental understanding.  
Showing trends over time of measurements, and breaking down the measurements by 
district, village, and even neighborhood, adds a qualitative aspect to better understand 
what is actually occurring in the conflict and if the forces are making progress.  For 
instance, in Petraeus’s September 2007 report to Congress, he displayed a chart showing 
the density of sectarian incidents in Baghdad neighborhoods to reflect progress being 
made in reducing ethno-sectarian violence, and to identify the areas that remain 
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challenging and need increased emphasis.171  Since these quantitative metrics provided 
feedback on the primary mission of population security and helped to adjust operations 
toward decisive areas, then the metrics proved appropriate for the conflict. 
However, quantitative metrics on sectarian violence and other enumerated data 
are not alone sufficient for guiding successful operations in IW.  As Jason Campbell and 
Michael O’Hanlon describe, historically success in IW, and specifically COIN, requires 
thorough understanding of population perceptions: 
The experience of successful counterinsurgency and stabilization missions 
in places such as the Philippines and Malaysia, by contrast, leads us to 
place a premium on tracking trends in the daily lives of typical citizens. 
How secure are they, and who do they credit for that security? How 
hopeful do they find their economic situation, regardless of the nation’s 
GDP or even their own personal wealth at a moment in time? Do they 
think their country’s politics are giving them a voice?172 
These aforementioned details on population security and population perceptions are best 
captured through qualitative, outcome-based metrics.  Petraeus realized that for the new 
strategy to be successful they had to “make life better in the neighborhoods,” and doing 
so required “feedback from the field, and then issuing ‘Frag-Os,’ or fragmentary changes, 
to the existing campaign plan.173  The qualitative reports generated through the daily 
population engagements and activities of the JSS’s and COP’s provided detailed 
understanding of the population.  Additionally, Petraeus demanded the qualitative aspect 
metrics by ensuring “our analysis of that data is conducted with rigor and consistency, as 
our ability to achieve a nuanced understanding of the security environment is dependent 
on collecting and analyzing data in a consistent way over time.”174  Thus, the qualitative 
metrics were important in order to understand the complex conditions in individual 
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neighborhoods and adjust strategy as necessary to fit the environment.  Consequently, 
since the strategy’s primary mission was population security, the metrics utilized by 
Petraeus and his forces were appropriate for the conflict. 
G. CONCLUSION 
Overall, analysis of the 2007 strategy in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM provides 
important insights into the metrics development process for IW conflicts.  During this 
time period, the conflict had a high national imperative as political and popular discontent 
for the increasingly violent conflict made the new strategy an all or nothing venture.  If 
conditions did not improve, the United States faced strategic withdrawal and potential 
failure.  In an attempt to save the conflict, the Bush administration surged additional 
troops to Iraq and changed the mission priority to securing the population.  Based on our 
Metrics Development Chain explained in Chapter II, the high national imperative and the 
increased resources committed to the conflict could have detrimental effects on the 
military organization and the metrics development process.  The high national imperative 
places stress on the military organization, as demands for progress from policymakers 
pressure the military organization to focus inward on measures of activity because they 
are easily accessible and provide a short-term illusion of progress.  Furthermore, the 
increased force size pressures the military organization to rely more on standardization 
and formalization to manage the additional resources, and thus evaluate itself more on 
internal productivity instead of on effects on the environment.  However, the military 
forces in Iraq, under the leadership of General Petraeus, managed to effectively deal with 
these negative pressures, develop appropriate metrics, and achieve success.   
The key to the new strategy and its eventual success was the shift in focus to 
population security and the establishment of military security stations and outposts 
among the population to ensure security and stability.  The forward projection of military 
forces out into the population allowed accurate and timely collection of both quantitative 
and qualitative measurements of the outcomes of military actions, or the effects of 
operations on the environment, at local levels.  Petraeus was then able to use this 
accumulated data to provide external stakeholders with easily portrayed quantitative 
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metrics that indicated progress in qualitative detail.  Thus, the military was able to 
appease the pressures of the high national imperative, while still remaining focused on 
the conflict environment.   
Likewise, the military in Iraq was able to avoid pressures of bureaucratic 
standardization and formalization often inherent with an increase in forces because of the 
increased professionalism and experience of the forces.  With the new strategy, Petraeus 
could maximize the increased capabilities of the forces by decentralizing operations and 
neighborhood responsibilities down to the JSS’s and COP’s.  As these individual units 
managed their own conflicts from their outstations, they relied more on qualitative, 
outcome-based metrics to effectively describe their environment, create conditions for 
increased stability, and achieve success.   
However, it is important to note that the employment of small U.S. units to 
remote locations tasked with population security worked in Iraq because of the unique 
conditions of that environment.  At the end of 2006, the insurgents had already lost much 
of their local support, the population was tired of the conflict, and U.S support and 
reinforcement was always close by—conditions that are not readily transferrable to other 
conflicts, like Afghanistan.175  Thus, one IW strategy and its associated metrics are not 
universal to every conflict.  What is necessary is the ability to develop the appropriate 
metrics that allow understanding of the complex IW environment.  In Iraq in 2007, the 
military was able to overcome the pressures of a high national imperative and machine 
bureaucratic tendencies to effectively develop and utilize qualitative metrics that 
accurately reflected outcomes and directed U.S. efforts toward success. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The case studies described in the previous chapters illustrate the impact of the 
Metrics Development Chain on the creation and selection of metrics to evaluate success 
in IW.  The national imperative of the conflict and the organizational tendencies of the 
military force package selected for the conflict appear to influence how the military 
evaluates itself and adjusts its strategy, based off appropriate or inappropriate metrics.  
Table 1 summarizes the Metrics Development Chain in the IW conflicts of the Greek 
Civil War, the Vietnam War, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. 


























Table 1.    The Metrics Development Chain in the Greek Civil War, Vietnam, and 
Iraq 
As Table 1 shows, the Greek Civil War and the Vietnam War from 1965–1968 lie 
at opposite ends of the spectrum, in terms of having favorable conditions for developing 
and selecting metrics appropriate for the IW conflict.  In the Greek Civil War, the low 
national imperative of the conflict resulted in less demands for information and less 
pressure for progress.  Additionally, the low national imperative resulted in the 
deployment of a smaller force package that had both the capabilities and latitude to be 
flexible, adaptive, and organized to best suit the environment of the conflict.  As a result, 
the force package relied on metrics mostly derived from qualitative measures of 
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outcomes to best interpret the environment, assess the conflict, and focus strategy toward 
success.  However, in Vietnam from 1965–1968, this was not the case.  The high national 
imperative of the conflict created both political and military demands for decisive action 
and reports of progress.  This pressured the military organization to use the most 
accessible metrics based on quantitative measures of activity to satisfy external demands.  
Additionally, the high national imperative resulted in the deployment of a large force 
package that immediately developed an inward focus, relying on bureaucratic principles 
of standardization and formalization to efficiently manage the massive amount of 
resources.  These organizational tendencies inhibited MACV’s ability to be adaptive and 
focus on the qualitative measurements of outcomes necessary to understanding the 
complex IW environment.  Thus, the pressures on MACV prevented the organization 
from focusing on the appropriate metrics and recognizing that its strategy was failing. 
Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2007 demonstrated that a military organization in IW 
can overcome the negative influences associated with the Metrics Development Chain.  
During this period, the conflict had a high national imperative due to the political 
tensions and rising violence.  Additionally, the United States increased the force package 
allocated to the conflict with the new surge strategy.  However, the military organization 
in Iraq was able to overcome these pressures by decentralizing their forces to foster 
organizational tendencies more reliant on adaptation and mutual adjustment.  This 
allowed the military to rely more on quantitative, outcome-based metrics to effectively 
understand the environment and create conditions for success.  With the increased 
understanding of the environment, the military was able to easily provide external 
stakeholders with clear metrics that indicated progress in qualitative detail and reflected 
the outcomes of the strategy’s actions.  Thus, the military in Iraq successfully managed 
the Metrics Development Chain toward using appropriate metrics for the IW conflict. 
Overall, the case studies indicate that simply finding universal metrics for IW 
applicable across time and space is not, in itself, sufficient in solving the U.S.’s 
difficulties measuring its progress. In other words, solving our problems of metrics in IW 
is not solely about selecting the correct metrics.  Instead, it is also about managing the 
pressures that influence the organization’s development and selection of metrics to 
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interpret the environment, evaluate strategy, and adjust operations.  The pressures 
generated by the national imperative and military organizational tendencies hinder the 
selection of appropriate metrics. 
The national imperative functions as one of the driving influences in determining 
military commitment to a conflict.  In this process, policy makers must consider a myriad 
of factors and demands that may transcend the scope of responsibilities of those military 
leaders assigned to the conflict.   Satisfying these complex factors creates a pressure for 
results showing the efficient use of national resources.  This pressure can create a demand 
for evaluations of progress that trade depth and accuracy for expediency.  As a result of 
this pressure, senior military leaders are tasked with the responsibility to articulate the 
characteristics of the conflict to policy makers in easily expressed quantitative forms.  
Additionally, the high demand for information can persuade the military organization to 
express progress through easily attainable measurements of activity, instead of 
measurements focus on outcomes and true effects on the environment.  However, the 
military must not let these demands guide the focus of the organization and the evaluation 
of strategy.  General Petraeus in Iraq successfully managed the pressures of a high 
national imperative by keeping the organization focused on qualitative assessments of the 
environment, while satisfying policy makers with detailed, quantitative reports that 
depicted improving trends over time and evidence of the strategy’s success.  Thus, it is 
possible to manage a high national imperative and remain focused on evaluating the 
complex IW environment. 
Additionally, the military organization selected to carry out an IW mission must 
deliberately work toward limiting and preventing its natural, but counterproductive 
organizational tendencies from evolving.  Specifically, it must resist reliance upon the 
standardization and formalization associated with dogmatic commitment to doctrine and 
conventional processes.  This process begins with senior military leaders’ assuming the 
responsibility to advise policymakers on appropriate force package selection for the 




contrary.  These leaders must provide strong advocacy for solutions and measures that 
reduce or mute the negative organizational tendencies prevalent in large bureaucratic 
military organizations.   
Adaptive, innovative, and flexible organizations find success in IW because of the 
complex and unstable nature of such conflicts.  The examples of JUSMAPG and the 
strategy shift in the OIF surge are just such examples.  Immediately following WWII, at 
the height of the military’s bureaucratic power and influence, it managed to resist its 
natural organizational inclinations and instead form the JUSMAPG in a way that 
permitted constant adaptation to reflect the significant aspects of the Greek Civil War.  
The surge in Iraq owes its success to more the adaptive techniques and increased mutual 
adjustment of the forces, than to an increase in available combat power.  In a contrasting 
example, the MACV maintained the tenets of doctrine, constantly investing time, energy, 
and manpower to degrading enemy combat power; therefore, the metrics that MACV 
selected and employed to assess efforts never fully reflected the nature of the conflict in 
Vietnam.   
Furthermore, military leaders must understand the nature of the conflict in order 
to effectively organize their forces, evaluate the environment, and advise their political 
leadership.  Generals Petraeus and Van Fleet based their assessments on the situation in 
Iraq and Greece in such a manner, refusing to be compelled to articulate the situation to 
support an agenda other than the reality on the battlefield.  Their successes, as compared 
to the failed example of MACV efforts in Vietnam, illustrate that simple data collection 
is insufficient.  The analytical effort required to honestly and objectively weight and 
employ that collected data must be commensurate with the task.   
To determine the most accurate methods for gaining and interpreting 
environmental assessments, certain organizational tendencies favor the IW combatant.  
The decentralization of authority and responsibility allows for qualitative analysis of 
specific events, circumstances, and geographic regions.  This implies certain 
responsibilities and requirements for subordinate elements in order for them to make a 
meaningful contribution.  First, the decentralized elements must have the competence to 
encapsulate the relevant details of their experience.  A professional force is required, one 
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that has the ability to qualitatively and/or quantitatively articulate the meaningful factors 
of their environment in accordance with the commander’s intent and the desired end 
state.  Second, the military organization must have the analytical ability to collect, 
process, and interpret these assessments, collating the subordinate feedback into a 
coherent assessment that can accurately inform military leaders on future courses of 
action and ultimately provide frank and valid feedback to national level decision makers.  
For instance, JUSMAPG’s evaluation of the environment in the Greek Civil War is 
demonstrative of this relationship as junior military advisors’ feedback regarding their 
Greek counterparts’ ability and aggressiveness became a significant qualitative feedback 
mechanism.  This strategy was confirmed and reinforced by quantitative measures.  As 
the communist guerillas became more and more estranged from the populace, the number 
of enemy killed and captured, and the exchange ratio from engagements became a 
relevant indicator.  Without establishing the conditions that improved the Greek Army, 
such measures would have been less telling.  In Iraq, the higher headquarters relied on 
subordinate units to become experts on their assigned area of responsibility.  This 
deliberate empowerment of subordinate headquarters allowed for detailed and accurate 
assessments that built a more accurate feedback mechanism to support the new strategy.  
The latitude to make area-specific assessments provided for variation, which was not 
present at the lower levels of MACV, where the emphasis to engage enemy combatant 
units overpowered the regionally specific recommendations of subordinate commands. 
Thus, the decentralization of forces and authority is essential in IW conflicts, provided 
the forces have the professional capability, in order to maximize understanding of the 
local environments and measure progress and success.  Some contend that these preferred 
organizational characteristics favor the employment of Special Operations Forces.  
However, our cases demonstrate that any type of military unit, given the appropriate 
training, capabilities, and autonomy to facilitate environmental understanding and 
adaptation can exhibit these preferred characteristics. 
As shown by our case studies on the Greek Civil War, the Vietnam War from 
1965–1968, and Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2007, the influences of the Metrics 
Development Chain can result in a military organization in IW selecting metrics that are 
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inappropriate for the conflict and ineffective in gauging success.    Additional research 
could examine the impact of the Metrics Development Chain on other IW conflicts in 
order to further assess the specific influences of this causal chain, or to determine how 
different military organizations coped with the pressures affecting metrics creation and 
selection.  For instance, a cursory examination of U.S. involvement in Operation 
Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan (OEF-A) and Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines 
(OEF-P) appears to reinforce the influences of the Metrics Development Chain.   In 
Afghanistan, despite the evident early success of smaller decentralized forces, the 
relatively high national imperative of the conflict ostensibly drove the commitment of 
larger forces and greater resources to the conflict.  Managing this increased force size and 
the demands for information associated with a high national imperative, the military 
organization in Afghanistan appears to have become reliant on the bureaucratic 
tendencies of standardization and formalization to ensure the efficient management of 
resources and timely reporting.  In turn, after over 10 years of continuous conflict, U.S 
forces in Afghanistan still appear to struggle to effectively interpret the conflict 
environment.  This outcome seems to result from the failure to utilize ideal organizational 
characteristics for IW, and an inability to focus on the necessary qualitative assessments 
of outcomes.  As a result, the military in Afghanistan continues to have difficulty 
developing and selecting appropriate metrics for evaluating progress and success.   
In contrast, in OEF-P the U.S. military appears to be effectively developing and 
utilizing appropriate metrics of success.  The low national imperative of the IW conflict 
in the Philippines has resulted in the commitment of fewer resources and less 
constraining demands for indicators of progress and success.  Thus, the low national 
imperative has allowed the deployed military force to focus on the correct organizational 
characteristics best suited to manage the conflict.  The U.S. military in the Philippines 
seems to successfully employ the characteristics of decentralization, adaptation, and 
mutual adjustment to effectively understand the complex and unstable IW environment.  
Additionally, through qualitative assessments of the host nation military force 
capabilities, population perceptions, and enemy capabilities, the U.S. military has gained 
increased knowledge of the outcomes of its efforts.  Consequently, in the Philippines the 
 97 
military organization appears to create and apply appropriate metrics that facilitate the 
evaluation and adjustment of strategy toward eventual success.  Thus, it initially appears 
that the United States’ efforts in OEF-A and OEF-P demonstrate the potential positive 
and negative influences of the Metrics Development Chain.  Further analysis of these 
conflicts, and additional IW conflicts like the United States involvement in the El 
Salvadorian civil war, could provide further case studies to validate our findings.   
Along with additional case studies, further exploration of civil-military 
relationships can provide more insight into the problems of metrics development.  The 
necessary interaction between senior military leaders and the civil authority responsible 
for directing the application of military power prompts important questions about how to 
resolve conflicts arising from the differing interests and perspectives.  Instances where 
the limited requirements of a given conflict contrast with the demands prompted by a 
high national imperative illustrate merely one way in which tension can arise between 
these two groups when deciding upon the type of force package and strategy to employ.  
How does the military authoritatively advocate an appropriate package and strategy when 
a high national imperative prompts political pressure to the contrary?  Ultimately, civilian 
authority must remain sovereign, as mandated by the Constitution, but acquiescing to 
political pressure that advocates an inappropriate force package and strategy that will 
potentially prolong the conflict and increase its cost is unacceptable.  Senior military 
leaders, understanding the nature of the conflict in question, must work to ensure the 
organization deployed achieves its objectives as efficiently and effectively as possible, 
thereby minimizing unnecessary loss.   
Alternatively, history demonstrates that senior military leaders often advocate the 
deployment of large bureaucratic force packages irrespective of the attendant national 
imperative and type of conflict in question.  In these instances, to what degree should the 
civilian leadership exert their authority and dictate the specific force package 
composition and strategy?  The political leadership may well insist on a smaller force 
package when faced with a low-imperative conflict, contrary to the inclination of the 
military leadership who view this as significantly increasing risk to the force and the 
mission.  The conflict between Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and senior 
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military leaders planning the invasion of Iraq highlights this dynamic.  Senior military 
leaders pushed for an extremely large invasion force due to perceived risks to the force 
and innate bureaucratic tendencies, while Secretary Rumsfeld instead demanded a 
smaller commitment of resources.  The prolonged duration of the conflict and Iraq’s 
uncertain future prompts concerns about how the tensions between civil and military 
leaders can affect how the military organizes, executes, and assesses its strategy in IW.  
Clearly, the need for strong senior military advocacy raises important questions about 
civil-military relations and specifically, how far into the DoD organization the civilian 
authority should reach.  As IW conflicts appear to remain a feature of the future global 
environment, improving these relationships remains important in order to effectively 
organize our forces for the conflict and interpret the conflict environment. 
Most importantly, the United States and its military must figure out how to 
effectively develop and employ metrics to evaluate progress and success in current and 
future IW conflicts in order to effectively utilize national resources.  It is not an easy task.  
“Metrics are dangerous and easily abused. But they may also be just about the best thing 
we have to inform our debate, keep our politicians honest, and help those Americans still 
legitimately confused about Iraq to figure out what they really think.”176  Therefore, the 
first step in effectively developing and applying metrics is to first understand them, 
understand the influences that affect their development and selection, and understand 
which metrics are appropriate to the individual conflict.   
 
                                                 
176 Jason Campbell and Michael E. O’Hanlon, “Measuring Progress in Iraq,” July 13, 2007, 
http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2007/0713iraq_ohanlon.aspx (accessed on October 30, 2011). 
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